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Abstract 
 
The use of and belief in the effectiveness of complementary and alternative medicine 
(CAM) is associated with two cognitive biases: over-reliance on intuitive thinking and 
ontological mistakes. This thesis reports five studies which explore the nature of these 
biases. 
Aims. The aim of study 1 was to develop and test a valid and reliable measure of belief 
in the effectiveness of CAM and use of CAM (the Attitudes to Complementary and 
Alternative Medicine scale; ACAM). Studies 2-3 explored whether the previously 
reported relationship between CAM beliefs and intuitive thinking could be found when 
using performance measures (rather than just self-report measures) of thinking. Studies 
4-5 tested the proposal that being able to spot ontological mistakes is a system 2, 
analytical process and that overlooking ontological mistakes is more likely when 
cognitive demands are high.  
Methods. Studies 1-3 employed a mixture of self-report questionnaires and 
performance measures of thinking (the cognitive reflection test and base rate 
problems) in a survey methodology. Studies 4-5 employed experimental methods, and 
specifically a variation of the syllogistic belief bias paradigm.  
Results. In study 1, a principal components analysis yielded four factors for the ACAM, 
each reflecting beliefs in the effectiveness of different categories of CAM (alternative 
whole medical systems, energy medicines, herbalism and natural products, mind and 
body approaches). The ACAM had good internal consistency and convergent validity. 
In study 2, psychology students’ self-reported analytical thinking was negatively 
related to belief in CAM effectiveness. In study 3, self-reported intuitive thinking was 
positively related to CAM beliefs in a mixed sample of students and the general 
population. Performance measures of thinking style were not consistently related to 
CAM beliefs. In studies 4-5, it was found that ontological correctness biased 
responding when simultaneous processing demands were low, but when ontological 
statements were embedded in difficult reasoning problems, particularly those in which 
belief and logic conflicted, ontological correctness was less likely to bias responding. 
Conclusions. These findings suggest that faith in CAM effectiveness depends not so 
much on the people’s actual thinking style but rather on people’s perception of their 
own thinking style. Furthermore, noticing ontological mistakes appears to be a system 
2, analytical process which is more difficult to carry out when simultaneous reasoning 
competes for processing capacity. However, the ability to spot ontological mistakes is 
made easier following simple psychoeducational instructions. These findings improve 
our understanding of the cognitive factors which might underpin beliefs in the 
effectiveness of CAM and have implications for the design of health psychology 
interventions to improve people’s health decision-making. 
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Preliminary Chapter. A systematic review of the traits and 
cognitions associated with use of and belief in complementary 
and alternative medicine (CAM). 
 
Running head: Traits, cognitions and CAM 
 
Acknowledgements: Thank you for the assistance from Dr Tim Moss and Dr Victoria 
Galbraith 
 
This chapter reports a systematic review as part of the assessment for the professional 
doctorate in health psychology. This systematic review has been assessed already but 
is included here for procedural reasons and also as its findings were used to develop 
the aims and predictions for the subsequent empirical work. Its inclusion therefore, 
helps to provide some context for the data collection which followed it. The theoretical 
links between the systematic review and the empirical work, as well as the process of 
moving from review to research design, are described in more detail in the next 
chapter (Chapter 1. Introduction). 
 
Although the systematic review and empirical work are related, the review and the rest 
of the thesis are also designed to be read as discrete entities. 
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Abstract 
Purpose: A systematic review with narrative synthesis aimed to establish which 
personality traits and cognitions predicted use of and belief in complementary and 
alternative medicine (CAM).  
Methods: Using key terms: ("complementary medicine" or "alternative medicine" or 
“holistic medicine”) and (personality or psychological or cogniti* or trait or “individual 
differences”), papers (between 2000 and 2016) were identified from Medline, embase, 
HIMC, CAB abstracts international, CINAHL, AMED and Psychinfo. Manual searches on 
these topics were also conducted and key authors were contacted. Nineteen papers 
were selected for review.  
Results: The trait openness to experience was weakly associated with CAM use. 
Intuitive thinking and ontological confusions were the most reliable cognitive 
predictors of CAM beliefs. Studies testing the role of cognitions in CAM use/belief 
were mostly on non-clinical samples, whilst studies on OtE and CAM use/belief were 
mostly on clinical patients. Quality of studies varied but unrepresentative samples, 
untested outcome measures, reliance on cross-sectional designs and simplistic 
statistical analysis were the most common flaws.  
Conclusions: Intuitive thinking and ontological confusions are associated with CAM 
beliefs. Openness to experience is only weakly associated with use of CAM. 
Key words: Complementary medicine, alternative medicine, traits, cognition, belief. 
 
Introduction 
Complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) encompasses many treatments, 
outside conventional healthcare, including acupuncture, aromatherapy, chiropractic, 
healing, herbal medicine, homoeopathy, hypnosis, massage, meditation, nutritional 
therapy, reflexology, reiki, and yoga (Zollman & Vickers, 1999). Although there is no 
universal CAM definition, Ernst (2000) conceptualises it as diagnosis, treatment and/or 
prevention which provides an unmet need, or complements or diversifies orthodox 
medicine. CAM has become more popular in recent decades. In England, a large 
household survey showed that 44.0% of respondents have used CAM in their lifetime, 
26.3% in the last 12 months and that 12.1% had consulted with a CAM practitioner 
within the preceding 12 months (Hunt, Coelho, Wider, Perry, Hung, Terry & Ernst, 
2010). Metcalfe, Williams, McChesney, Patten & Jetté (2010) report similar rates for 
CAM practitioner visits in Canadians (12.4%) although this varied according to medical 
status: for example asthma patients used CAM more, whereas diabetes patients less 
frequently than the general population. According to Barnes, Bloom and Nahim (2008) 
nearly four out of 10 adults in the US report CAM use in the previous 12 months. The 
incidence of CAM use accelerated in the US during the 1990s: Eisenberg, Davis, 
Ettner, Appel, Wilkey, Van Rompay & Kessler (1998) reported a rise from 33.8% in 1990 
up to 42.1% in 1997. A systematic review shows that the rates of CAM use are even 
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higher in East Asia (Harris, Cooper, Relton & Thomas, 2012). As the statistics show, 
CAM use is not universal, many choose not to use such treatments. This raises 
questions about what kind of people are most likely to believe in and use CAM. 
 
Health-related reasons for CAM use 
Reasons for CAM use may depend on presence and type of medical condition. The 
most commonly reported motivations for CAM use are as remedies for chronic 
conditions (Eisenberg et al. 1998). Barnes et al. (2008) found that back, neck or joint 
pain, along with colds, anxiety and depression were frequently cited conditions treated 
with CAM in the US. In Europe, CAM use in cancer patients increases after diagnosis, 
often explained by patients as helping the body ‘fight cancer’ (Molassiotis, Fernadez-
Ortega, Pud, Ozden, Scott, Panteli,... & Patiraki, 2005). CAM is used for less serious 
conditions, for health promotion and disease prevention in Japan (Yamashita, 
Tsukayama & Sugishita, 2002) and primarily for health maintenance in Singapore (Lim, 
Sadarangani, Chan & Heng, 2005).  
 
Demographic predictors of CAM use 
In addition to health status, demographics are important predictors of CAM use. A 
systematic review shows that female and younger cancer patients - and in Western 
countries, those with higher incomes and more years of education - use CAM more. In 
Turkey and in Hawaii however, CAM use was linked with lower income (Verhoef, 
Balneaves, Boon & Vroegindewey, 2005), perhaps as it is less costly than orthodox 
medicine. A review of the general population and medical professionals (Frass, Strassl, 
Friehs, Müllner, Kundi & Kaye, 2012) supports these sex and income effects, but (in 
contrast to Verhoef et al., 2005) found higher CAM use in older people. A Taiwanese 
survey found that demographics differed depending on whether CAM use was for 
health maintenance (e.g. male, fewer years of education) or illness treatment (e.g. 
lower income) (Wu, Chou, Chen, Chen, Yeh & Lin, 2012). In their US review, Barnes et 
al. (2008) found that native American and white adults were more likely to use CAM 
than Asian and black adults. 
 
Psychological predictors of CAM use: beliefs and attitudes 
In their review of beliefs associated with CAM use, Bishop, Yardley and Lewith (2007), 
found that a collaborative and participative approach to health as well as active coping, 
particularly in cancer and HIV patients, predicted CAM use. Perceptions of illness 
causality (e.g. diet, stress) also predicted CAM use, as did unconventional life 
philosophies (e.g. post-materialism) and spirituality. A subsequent review of CAM use 
in type 2 diabetes suggests beliefs and attitudes are more important predictors than 
demographics (Chang, Wallis & Tiralongo, 2012). In US HIV patients, negative attitudes 
to conventional antiretroviral medication predicted CAM use (Hsiao, Wong, Kanouse, 
Collins, Liu, Andersen,... & Wenger, 2003). CAM use/belief in CAM may also be more 
prevalent in those with a holistic philosophy (i.e. the connectedness of mind, body and 
spirit) toward health (Astin, 1998), with modern health worries or mistrust of 
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conventional science and orthodox medicine (Furnham, 2007; Jeswani & Furnham, 
2010; Vincent & Furnham, 1996). CAM use/belief has also been shown to associate 
with belief in the paranormal (Jeswani & Furnham, 2010; Van den Bulck & Custers, 
2009). 
 
Study aims 
Previous reviews have explored CAM users’ attitudes/beliefs and their demographics 
However there is no review on the cognitions (e.g. thinking style, reasoning bias, etc.) 
or personality traits which predict CAM use/beliefs, despite these factors having been 
explored in a number of empirical studies. Lindeman and colleagues propose that an 
intuitive reasoning style and ontological confusions predict CAM (Lindeman, 2011; 
Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013), and that cognitive factors predict CAM belief more 
powerfully than demographics (Lindeman, 2011). Others report that traits such as 
openness to experience (hereafter OtE; being imaginative, unconventional and willing 
to consider new ideas) characterise CAM users (e.g. Sirios & Gick, 2002). Paranormal 
beliefs are associated with personality and reasoning (Swami, Pietschnig, Stieger & 
Voracek, 2011; Rogers, 2014), as CAM belief and paranormal belief are correlated 
(Jeswani & Furnham, 2010) CAM too may have these psychological correlates.  
 
The literature shows that traits and cognitive style have been studied in relation to both 
CAM use and CAM beliefs. The aim is a systematic review of research into cognitions 
and personality traits associated with use of or belief in CAM effectiveness. No such 
review has yet been conducted and there is a need to evaluate the quality of research 
in this area. There is a theoretical and empirical basis for this review to include both 
clinical and general population studies which measure both CAM beliefs and CAM use. 
This paper will not review research on demographics, nor studies of attitudes and 
beliefs which predict CAM use/beliefs (e.g. paranormal belief, health beliefs, beliefs 
about medicine, etc.) as these factors have already been the subject of systematic 
reviews. 
 
Method 
Search strategy and inclusion/exclusion criteria 
Relevant studies were selected through searches of online databases (Medline, 
embase, HIMC, CAB abstracts international, CINAHL, AMED, Psychinfo), through 
manual searches of the reference lists of selected studies, by scanning article titles in 
key journals and by contacting key authors in the field. Database searches were carried 
out using the following key terms: ("complementary medicine" or "alternative 
medicine" or “holistic medicine”) and (personality or psychological or cogniti* or trait 
or “individual differences”). Following de-duplication, 611 unique titles remained. 
Inclusion/exclusion criteria, for retaining papers for further scrutiny, were as follows: 
published in English between Jan 2000 and May 2016; non-expert population i.e. not 
qualified or trainee health professionals, not healthcare providers; not studies on 
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parents who advocate CAM for their children; studies which measure cognitions and/or 
traits; not studies measuring only beliefs and attitudes which predict CAM use/beliefs; 
not studies of demographics, transient affect, epidemiology, prevalence or 
effectiveness of CAM; quantitative not qualitative or reviews; the outcome measure 
was use of CAM or belief in CAM’s effectiveness. 
 
Study selection 
Two raters independently screened 611 titles against inclusion criteria, leaving 81 
(κ=.8). Following abstract screening and reference list searching, 23 papers remained, 
inconsistencies between the raters were resolved collaboratively by referring to 
inclusion/exclusion criteria. After full-text screening, three were removed as they were 
conference presentations and one as it did not report relationships between CAM 
beliefs and traits/cognitions, leaving 19 papers. The study selection process is shown in 
Figure P1. 
Figure P1 near here 
Data extraction 
Data extracted from the included studies is displayed in Table P2. Only relationships or 
effects pertaining to the predictors of interest were recorded, effects relating to 
demographic or social variables, beliefs, transient affect or health status were ignored. 
When assessing the results of included studies, if the traits/cognitions had been 
entered into a regression or an alternative multifactorial analysis, beta values or odds 
ratios were extracted. If not, then simple correlations or group comparison data was 
recorded.  
 
Quality appraisal 
Quality was assessed using the NICE Quality appraisal checklist for quantitative studies 
reporting correlations and associations (NICE, 2006; shown in Table P1). The NICE 
criteria rate studies on internal and external validity. The outcomes are: - few or no 
checklist criteria have been fulfilled; + some of the criteria are fulfilled, and where not 
fulfilled, or not adequately described, conclusions are unlikely to be altered; ++ all or 
most criteria are fulfilled, and where not, conclusions are very unlikely to alter. Some of 
the items on the checklist were not used in this review, as they related to experimental 
designs only, e.g. ‘Selection of exposure and comparison group’, ‘Was follow-up time 
meaningful?’; or were not deemed relevant, e.g. ‘Is the setting applicable to the UK?’. 
In Table P1, the first three items yield an overall external validity rating (far-right column 
of Table P1), the rest of the items derive the overall internal validity rating (second 
column from right). Included studies were independently rated by two of the authors as 
either low, medium or high in quality. High quality studies were those with at least ++ 
and + rating on the two overall categories of external and internal validity respectively. 
Medium quality studies were those with + and +, or with ++ and -. Low quality studies 
were those with + and - or with - and -. 
 
Table P1 near here 
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Data synthesis 
Firstly a narrative analysis was carried out. The studies were categorised according to 
whether clinical or non-clinical samples, i.e. whether the participants were recruited 
because of a specific diagnosis. Clinical patients' motivations for CAM use may be 
different to those of non-patients. Patients may use CAM as a last resort, to sustain 
hope, to control symptoms (Verhoef et al., 2008). Non-patients may be motivated to 
use CAM for different reasons, such as prevention or wellbeing (Verhoef et al., 2008). 
Personality traits and cognitions were also examined separately. The trustworthiness of 
the analysis was assessed through discussion between the authors. 
 
Results 
Study Characteristics 
With dates ranging from 2002 to 2014, the studies were conducted in the USA (k = 6), 
USA and various Asian countries (k = 1), Canada (k = 2), Finland (k = 4), Italy (k = 1), 
Japan (k = 1), Netherlands (k = 1), Poland (k = 1), Turkey (k = 1) and the UK (k = 1). 
Most studies (k=12) sampled on students or the general population, with the rest (k = 
7) based on patient samples. In all but two of the clinical studies, samples comprised 
cancer patients. The smallest sample size was 49, but all other samples were ≥ 100, 
with most over 200 (k = 12), the largest being 3261 (study details shown in Table P2). 
 
Table P2 near here 
Clinical studies: personality variables 
The personality variables most commonly tested in clinical studies (three out of seven) 
were the big-five personality traits (e.g. John & Srivastava, 1999). Two of these studies 
(Hogan, 2006, rheumatology patients; Lo-Fo-Wong et al., 2012, cancer patients) report 
positive relationships between OtE and both provider-led and self-led CAM use 
(although in Hogan’s study, this was a composite measure of both). Hogan (2006) 
found no relationship between beliefs about CAM effectiveness and OtE, even when 
testing simple correlations. Olchowska-Kotala (2013) reports a negative relationship 
with OtE, but the outcome was willingness to use CAM in hypothetical situations. 
Olchowska-Kotala (2013) speculates that cancer patients’ CAM decisions are pragmatic 
and based on medical need and therefore OtE is not needed. However, this conflicts 
with the findings of Lo-Fo-Wong et al. (2012) who also used the same measure of the 
big-five as Olchowska-Kotala (2013) (the revised NEO personality inventory; Costa & 
McCrae, 1992). Olchowska-Kotala’s (2013) study was also lower in quality compared to 
Hogan (2006) and Lo-Fo-Wong et al. (2012), primarily because of an unrepresentative 
and underpowered sample. All three studies used regression analysis, rather than 
simple correlations only and reported internal consistency in the outcome; the latter 
two studies also report some tests of validity. Therefore the corresponding findings of 
Hogan (2006) and Lo-Fo-Wong (2013) should be held in greater confidence. 
Olchowska-Kotala’s (2013) was the only clinical study to have measured the other big-
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five traits: extraversion and neuroticism were both positively related to willingness to 
use CAM; agreeableness and conscientiousness were unrelated to CAM use. 
 
Measures of locus of control (LoC) featured in two studies. Sirois (2008) reported a 
positive relationship between perceived control over health and CAM use, and a 
negative relationship between CAM use and beliefs that health status is due to chance. 
Lo-Fo-Wong et al. (2012) found no such relationships, although differences between 
measures of LoC, patient population and nationality may explain this, particularly as 
previous literature shows that predictors of CAM vary across countries (e.g. Verhoef et 
al., 2005). Although both studies were rated high in quality, the all-female sample in 
Lo-Fo-Wong et al. (2012) may explain the conflicting findings, given that women are 
commonly reported in the literature as more likely to use CAM.  
 
Two clinical studies report on trait anxiety. Takeda et al. (2012) show that CAM users 
were higher in trait anxiety. In contrast, Tarhan et al. (2011) report that CAM users had 
lower State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & 
Jacobs, 1983) scores. However, as Tarhan et al. conflated the state anxiety and trait 
anxiety scores, their findings are difficult to interpret, particularly as Takeda et al. (2012) 
found that state anxiety scores showed the opposite relationship with CAM use to that 
of trait scores (i.e. CAM users had lower state anxiety). Disparity between the two 
studies may be attributed to quality: the Takeda et al. (2012) study was of high quality, 
whereas the Tarhan et al. (2011) study was deemed to be of low standard due to low 
internal (simple group comparisons instead of multifactorial) and external validity. 
 
As no other traits featured in more than one clinical study, the reliability of their 
relationships is uncertain. However, some of these variables may be loosely 
categorized as ‘coping’. Sense of coherence - to view life as understandable, 
manageable and meaningful (Antonovsky, 1993) - was positively associated with 
current and past CAM use (Bonacchi et al., 2014). Similarly, Hogan (2006) found 
resilience to be positively associated with both self-directed CAM use and belief in 
CAM effectiveness. However, a related concept – coping with the emotions brought 
about by illness, was reported by Sirois (2008) as negatively associated with CAM use. 
As all three studies were of high standard, these contradictions are apparently not due 
to quality, but may reflect differences in coping measures and/or differences in patient 
population and nationality.  Sirois (2008) also found CAM use was related to positive 
reinforcement-based motivations. 
 
Clinical studies: cognitions 
Cognitive style featured in only one clinical study. Olchowska-Kotsala (2013) measured 
self-reported thinking style with the Mind Types Checklist (Nosal, 1992). Emotion-
based (intuitive, automatic) thinking and rational (deliberate, analytical) thinking were 
both positively related with willingness to use CAM, suggesting CAM use is related to 
two different cognitive styles. This requires replication as the study has questionable 
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external validity and was the only clinical study to test cognition. Other thinking styles 
failed to predict willingness to use CAM: namely typical (preference for simplistic, 
superficial thought) and creative thinking styles.  
 
Non-clinical studies: personality variables 
Turning to non-clinical studies, again the big-five personality traits featured more 
commonly than any other. In four studies, OtE was positively associated (weakly to 
moderately) with CAM use (Honda & Jacobson, 2005; Lombart, 2002; Sirois & Gick, 
2002; Won, 2014), in a fifth, OtE was associated weakly with willingness to use CAM 
(Smith et al. 2008). In Ho’s (2012) study, a positive relationship between OtE and CAM 
beliefs was found in US students but not students from Asian countries. Furnham 
(2007), Hogan (2006) and Won (2014) reported no relationship between OtE and CAM 
beliefs. The studies reporting on OtE show a range of quality, with positive 
relationships evident in studies of high, medium and low standard. Amongst those 
reporting positive relationships, the Honda and Jacobson (2005) study was rated as 
highest, with a large, well-described representative sample and good internal validity 
too, with an outcome tested for content validity.  
 
Regarding other big-five traits, extraversion was a positive predictor of CAM beliefs in 
Furnham’s (2007) study, but a negative predictor of CAM use in Honda and Jacobson’s 
(2005) study - the latter study was rated highest in quality. In other studies, extraversion 
was not a   predictor of self-reported CAM use (Lombart, 2002; Sirois & Gick, 2002) or 
of willingness to use CAM (Smith et al., 2008). None of the other three big-five 
variables were predictors of CAM in non-clinical studies (Furnham, 2007, Honda & 
Jacobson, 2005; Lombart, 2002; Sirois & Gick, 2002; Smith et al., 2008) aside from 
agreeableness, which predicted CAM beliefs in Furnham (2007), albeit with a weak 
effect size. Furnham (2007) reports virtually the same (weak) effect sizes for extraversion 
(r=.15) and agreeableness (r=−.16) that Lombart (2002) reports for extraversion 
(r=−.16). Furnham’s coefficients are statistically significant but not Lombart’s, only 
because of the larger sample size in the former (n=243 as opposed to n=160). 
 
Coping variables were related to CAM use in two non-clinical studies (Honda & 
Jacobson, 2005; LaCaille & Kuvaas, 2011). External coping (persistence in efforts to 
influence one’s environment) was negatively associated with CAM use, and internal 
coping (positive reappraisals) was positively associated with CAM use (Honda & 
Jacobson, 2005). Another type of general internal coping – lowering aspirations – was 
not associated. The authors note that external coping may be more stable than internal 
coping and that the two types of coping may be associated with different types of 
CAM. Smith et al. (2008) failed to find an effect of future-focused optimism, a similar 
construct to now-focused positive reappraisal, as measured in Honda and Jacobson’s 
(2005) study. LaCaille and Kuvaas (2011) found positive associations between CAM use 
and both active and support-seeking coping, whereas avoidant coping was positively 
associated with herbal supplement use specifically. Acceptance coping was not a 
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predictor. A concept which may serve as a coping strategy - spirituality (see Gall, 
Charbonneau, Clarke, Grant, Joseph & Shouldice, 2005) - was associated positively 
with willingness to use CAM by Smith et al. (2008). There is correspondence between 
Honda and Jacobson (2005) and LaCaille and Kuvaas (2011) on the importance of 
coping, but less support from Smith et al. (2008).  The inconsistency here may be due 
to differences in outcome measure as well as predictor variables. However, the external 
validity of Smith et al. (2008) is weaker than that of Honda and Jacobson (2005), whose 
study is based on a large, representative, general population survey.  
 
Locus of control was tested in two non-clinical studies: Sirois and Gick (2002) found 
neither internal nor external LoC as predictive of CAM use. Lombart (2002) also tested 
internal LoC and also failed to find a relationship with CAM use. One study noted a 
strong relationship between mood attention (awareness of one’s feelings) and 
willingness to use CAM (Smith et al., 2008). No other traits were found to be predictors 
of CAM use/beliefs. 
 
Non-clinical studies: cognitions 
Four non-clinical studies tested thinking style with the Rational-Experiential Inventory 
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999), which measures self-reported propensity for intuitive (rapid, 
instinctive) thinking and also rational (analytical, effortful) thought. Three of these 
studies (Lindeman, 2011; Saher & Lindeman, 2005; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2012) 
found positive relationships between intuitive thinking and beliefs about CAM 
effectiveness. One study (Won, 2014) found only a relationship between intuitive 
thinking and CAM use. None found an association between CAM beliefs and rational 
thought. Need for cognition (enjoying and seeking out effortful thought; see 
Cacioppo, Petty & Feng Kao, 1984) - a concept similar to Pacini and Epstein’s (1999) 
rational thinking – was also found to be unrelated to CAM use by LaCaille & Kuvaas 
(2011).  
 
Additionally, three studies reported (weak to moderate) positive relationships between 
beliefs about CAM effectiveness and ontological confusions (Lindeman, 2011; 
Lindeman & Saher, 2007; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2012). Core ontological knowledge 
incorporates understanding of the distinctions between physical, biological and mental 
phenomena and the key characteristics which define such phenomena. For example, 
mental phenomena are the product of animate beings with intentionality, physical 
objects exist without intentionality but may move when affected by external forces, 
biological organisms have organic properties such as growth and healing. Subtle 
ontological confusions are common in CAM (Lindeman, 2011), such as mistaking 
processes as material substances, or describing processes (e.g. energy; Chen, 2007) as 
intentional - characteristics which such phenomena could not possibly possess. Of the 
four studies by Lindeman and colleagues, two were judged to have weaker external 
validity (Saher & Lindeman, 2005; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2012). Despite this, the 
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findings from the four Lindeman studies are consistent, which suggests that the results 
were robust enough to overcome the varying quality. 
 
Discussion 
Traits and cognitions associated with CAM use/belief 
 
The factors most robustly associated with CAM use/belief were intuitive thinking and 
ontological confusions. Across clinical and non-clinical studies, OtE was only weakly 
related with CAM use and not at all with CAM beliefs. Intuitive thinking was also a 
consistent predictor of CAM beliefs, typically measured on Pacini and Epstein’s REI 
(1999). This suggests CAM believers habitually use rapid, instinctive and automatic 
thought. Previous literature suggests that intuitive thinkers find it difficult to inhibit 
automatic responses, despite recognition that one is going against his/her more 
rational judgement (De Neys, Vartanian & Goel, 2008). Decisions about health are 
influenced by strong emotions (Chapman & Coups, 2006), and CAM use is associated 
with affect-laden decisions such as hope (see Verhoef et al., 2005) and risk (Rakovitch, 
Pignol, Chartier, Ezer, Verma, Dranitsaris & Clemons, 2005). Thus despite the 
availability of scientific evidence for orthodox medicine, CAM may be attractive 
because it appeals to emotions, and this suits those who reason intuitively, even when 
aware that rational judgement has been overlooked. The review does not suggest 
however, that those who believe in CAM are also typically non-rational. The finding 
here that intuitive and rational thinking are not opposites nor mutually exclusive is 
consistent with previous literature showing the independence of these two processing 
styles (Handley, Newstead & Wright, 2000).  
 
In addition to reasoning, a further cognitive style – ontological confusions, also 
predicted CAM beliefs (Lindeman, 2011; Lindeman & Saher, 2007; Svedholm & 
Lindeman, 2012). For example belief in CAM was associated with unscientific 
conceptions of energy (that it can live, grow, die, that it can represent emotions, can 
be good or bad, etc.), and was also associated with assigning intentionality to internal 
organs, purpose to inanimate objects, etc. (Lindeman & Saher, 2007). According to 
Lindeman (2011), common claims about the integrity of CAM often reflect ontological 
confusions. Such claims do not merely come with a lack of scientific evidence, they are 
unfalsifiable (for example the notion of good or bad energy). Svedholm and Lindeman 
(2012) argue that, in line with dual process theories (e.g. Evans & Stanovich, 2013) 
ontological mistakes can be held alongside scientifically valid conceptions.  
 
Other traits and cognitions had less compelling support. It is impossible to conclude 
that any particular coping style is associated with CAM as the types of coping reported 
in the review vary greatly. Furthermore, in spite of the generally high quality of studies 
which tested coping (both clinical and non-clinical), its association with CAM was not 
supported in all studies and in one the relationship was negative. Locus of control also 
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failed to correlate with CAM. Inconsistency in the findings for LoC cannot necessarily 
be attributed to low quality but may be due to differences in methodology and 
population. Trait anxiety was only tested in two (clinical) studies, but the inconsistency 
of the findings here may be due to variations in methodological quality. 
 
There were no systematic differences between clinical and non-clinical studies 
regarding the traits associated with CAM. However only one high quality clinical study 
tested CAM beliefs; thinking styles and ontological confusions were mainly tested in 
non-clinical studies. In contrast with the non-clinical research, one clinical study 
(Olchowska-Kotala, 2013) reported both rational and emotional thinking to be 
positively related to willingness to use CAM. This could suggest a different cognitive 
style for CAM-using patients to that of CAM-using non-patients, however this finding 
would need further replication and such conclusions are also tempered by the low 
external validity of Olchowska-Kotala’s study. No clinical studies tested ontological 
confusions - suggesting an opportunity for future research.  
 
Critique of the literature 
One difficulty with studies on cognitions and CAM is that evidence comes mainly from 
Lindeman and colleagues’ research group. Perhaps because of this, these studies share 
other characteristics: non-clinical Finnish populations and measuring CAM beliefs not 
usage. Additionally these four studies vary in quality. Despite this criticism, Lindeman’s 
studies on ontological confusions represent a highly innovative approach to 
understanding CAM beliefs and offer a promise for further research.  
 
Most studies on intuitive and rational thinking employed the REI (Pacini & Epsten, 
1999). This self-report measure is not a performance test of dual process thinking and 
does not correlate with common reasoning paradigms such as syllogisms or Wason’s 
Selection task (Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright & Farrelly, 2004). The purported 
relationship between intuitive thinking and CAM beliefs would be more compelling if 
demonstrated with performance measures used in the reasoning literature such as the 
cognitive reflection test, which examines one’s ability to resist appealing automatic 
responses in favour of deliberate analytical reasoning (Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011). 
 
A prominent methodological failing in the literature reviewed here is that the universal 
adoption of cross-sectional, correlational designs, does not permit robust conclusions 
about causality. One could counter-argue that a causal relation in which CAM use or 
beliefs change one’s traits or cognitions is implausible. However, this counter-
argument may not always stand, as it is indeed possible that immersion in some CAM 
ideologies may foster generalised ontological confusions, such as intentionality in 
energy for example. Causal arguments would be more robust if experimental or 
longitudinal designs were adopted. 
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Outcome measures of CAM use and belief varied across studies reviewed here. In 
some studies, new measures were created and tested for reliability and validity, but in 
others, the outcome is merely a self-reported answer, and validity and reliability of the 
outcome is assumed but not tested. To ensure quality of future research, standardised, 
reliable and valid measures are needed, reflecting scores on both CAM use and belief.  
 
Many studies in this review have neglected to incorporate important covariates which 
are known to predict CAM use/beliefs, such as demographic variables and other 
psychosocial factors. Furthermore, some studies reported only simple correlations, 
instead of entering factors into a regression model with other important predictors. 
With the regression method previously significant simple-correlations may diminish or 
disappear as only the most robust predictors remain associated with the outcome. 
Future studies should attempt to avoid this mistake in order to reduce the chances of 
type 1 errors. 
 
Future research 
As found with other types of belief, CAM beliefs may associate with reasoning biases. 
For example, paranormal beliefs (which share variance with CAM beliefs, e.g. Jeswani 
and Furnham, 2010) correlate with intuitive thinking on the REI (Lindeman & Aarnio, 
2007), but are also associated with misperception of randomness (Rogers, 2014). 
Delusional belief too is predicted by intuitive thinking on the REI (Freeman, Evans & 
Lister, 2012) but is also related to a jump-to-conclusions bias (Fine, Gardner, Craigie & 
Gold, 2007) and a liberal acceptance bias (Moritz, Woodward, Jelinek & Klinge, 2008).  
 
Besides OtE, few other traits have emerged from this review as potential predictors of 
CAM use/belief. This may be because, aside from the big-five, relatively few traits have 
been repeatedly tested in the literature. Coping, trait anxiety and locus of control are 
plausible predictors of CAM. The inconsistent findings from the literature may reflect 
the shortage of good quality studies needed to fully establish reliable relationships. 
 
Given that numerous demographic and psychological factors may be associated with 
CAM use/belief, more multifactorial studies are needed so that a comprehensive 
model of CAM use/belief can be established. Multi-factor models have been 
formulated to explain other types of belief, such as delusions (e.g. Galbraith & 
Manktelow, 2014) and paranormal belief (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007). Existing models of 
health behaviours which differentiate between belief, motivation, intention and 
behaviour (e.g. self-determination theory, Deci & Ryan, 2011; theory of planned 
behaviour, Ajzen, 2011; health belief model, Norman & Brain, 2005) may provide a 
theoretical basis for testing conceptual models of CAM use/belief and for exploring in 
which situations beliefs and use coincide or diverge. 
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Conclusions 
 
We have reviewed the research literature to establish whether traits and cognitions 
predict use of and belief in CAM. Nineteen cross-sectional studies were selected. OtE 
was not associated with CAM beliefs; it was associated with CAM use in some studies, 
but the aggregated effect was weak. The other big-five traits were rarely related to 
CAM but other traits including LoC, trait anxiety or particular coping styles have been 
under-researched. Two types of cognitive style, intuitive thinking and ontological 
confusions were reliably associated with CAM beliefs. The studies were of varying 
quality, and the majority employed correlational designs. A greater understanding of 
the relationship between CAM use and CAM belief is also a priority for future research, 
and further work is needed to confirm whether the same traits and cognitions typify 
patients and non-patients. 
 
References (see final references list) 
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Table P1. The quality of the studies included in the review, assessed by the NICE Quality appraisal checklist for 
quantitative studies reporting correlations and associations (NICE, 2006). 
 1.1  1.2  1.3  2.2  2.4  3.1  4.1  4.2  4.3  4.6  5.1Study 
results 
internally 
valid? 
5.2 Findings generalisable 
to the source population 
(i.e. externally valid)? 
Bonacchi et 
al. (2014) ++ + ++ ++ ++ − + + + + + ++ 
Furnham 
(2007) ++ ++ + ++ − + ++ − − + + + 
Ho (2012) ++ + − ++ + − ++ + + ++ + + 
Hogan 
(2006) 	 + ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Honda & 
Jacobson 
(2005) 
++ ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
LaCaille & 
Kuvaas 
(2011) 
+ + ++ ++ + − ++ + + ++ + + 
Lindeman 
(2011) ++ ++ + ++ ++ + + ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Lindeman 
& Saher 
(2007) 
++ + - ++ − ++ + - - + + + 
Lo-Fo-
Wong et al. 
(2012) 
+ ++ ++ ++ ++ − ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Lombart 
(2002) ++ − − ++ − − ++ + ++ + + − 
Olchowska-
Kotala 
(2013) 
− − − ++ + + − ++ + ++ + − 
Saher & 
Lindeman 
(2005) 
+ − − ++ ++ + ++ ++ ++ + + − 
Sirois 
(2008) ++ + + ++ ++ − ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ + 
Sirois & 
Gick 
(2002) 
++ + + ++ − − ++ - - ++ + + 
Smith et al. 
(2008) ++ − − ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ − 
Svedholm 
& 
Lindeman 
(2013) 
+ NR NR ++ − + + - - + + − 
Takeda et 
al. (2012) ++ + + ++ ++ − ++ ++ ++ ++ + + 
Tarhan et 
al. (2011) + NR + ++ − − ++ − − ++ − − 
Won, 
(2014) ++ + + ++ ++ + + ++ ++ ++ ++ + 
Note: 1.1 Source population well described?; 1.2 Eligible population or area representative of the source 
population or area?; 1.3 Selected participants or areas represent the eligible population or area?; 2.2 Selection of 
explanatory variables based on a sound theoretical basis?; 2.4 Likely confounding factors identified and 
controlled?; 3.1 Outcome measures and procedures reliable?; 4.1 Sufficiently powered?; 4.2 Multiple explanatory 
variables considered in the analyses?; 4.3 Analytical methods appropriate?; 4.6 Precision of association given or 
calculable? Is association meaningful?; 5.1Study results internally valid?; 5.2 Findings generalisable to the source 
population (i.e. externally valid)?; NR = not recorded. 
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Table P2, part 1. Summary of the studies included in the review. 
Authors Bonacchi et al. Furnham Ho Hogan Honda & Jacobson LaCaille & Kuvaas Lindeman Lindeman & Saher 
Year 2014 2007 2012 2006 2005 2011 2011 2007 
Country Italy UK  USA USA USA Finland Finland 
Setting Secondary care, 
cancer 
General public US, Asia Secondary care, 
rheumatology 
US general 
population 
College General public University/ school 
Population Italian cancer 
patients 
UK general public Population US rheumatology 
patients 
US general 
population 
US College students General public Students 
Sample size 803 243 148 320 3032 370 1092 239 
Study aims Demographic and 
psychological 
characteristics of 
CAM users 
Whether personality, 
beliefs and attitudes 
predict beliefs/ 
attitudes to CAM and 
use of CAM 
Predictors of 
attitudes to CAM 
Relationships between 
self-reported health, 
personality variables 
and the use and 
effectiveness of CAM 
Association 
between CAM use 
& personality, 
coping, social 
support 
CAM use & 
associations with 
coping and self-
regulatory styles, 
healthcare satisfaction 
Compare cognitions, 
beliefs and 
demographic 
predictors of belief 
in CAM 
Association between 
ontological 
confusions and 
superstitious beliefs 
(including CAM) 
Design Correlational, 
cross-sectional 
Correlational, cross-
sectional 
Correlational, 
cross-sectional 
Correlational, cross-
sectional 
Correlational, 
cross-sectional 
Correlational, cross-
sectional 
Correlational, cross-
sectional 
Correlational, cross-
sectional 
Outcome 
measure 
Self-reported 
current and past 
use of CAM 
Belief in efficacy of 
CAM, attitude to 
CAM, safety of CAM 
Self-reported 
attitudes to 
alternative 
medicine 
CAM use and ratings of 
effectiveness of CAM 
Self-reported use of 
any CAM in past 
year 
Self-reported use of 
CAM and herbals 
supplements in past 
year 
Self-reported belief 
in CAM 
Self-reported belief in 
efficacy of CAM 
Outcome 
measure tested 
for reliability 
and validity? 
Not tested Content/ construct 
validity 
Not tested Internal reliability, 
discriminant validity 
Content validity Not tested Internal consistency Internal consistency 
Analysis  Regression Correlations Regression Regressions for total 
CAM use 
Regression Regression Regression Simple correlations 
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Table P2, part 2. Summary of the studies included in the review. 
Authors Bonacchi et 
al. 
Furnham Ho Hogan Honda & Jacobson LaCaille & 
Kuvaas 
Lindeman Lindeman & 
Saher 
Cognitions/traits 
related to CAM 
use or belief 
Sense of 
coherence 
& past use 
of CAM 
(OR=1.6,) 
Extraversion 
correlated with 
efficacy of CAM 
(r=.15) 
,agreeableness 
correlated with 
safety (r=.16) 
OtE, 
(American 
students, β 
= .276) 
Total CAM 
use: 
absorption 
(β =.396); 
OtE (β 
=.259);  
Practitioner-led 
CAM use: 
(OtE (r=.27); 
absorption 
(r=.27) 
Self-CAM 
use: 
Resilience 
(β =.170);  
Any CAM 
use: 
resilience 
(β =.136); 
positive 
affect (β 
=.138); 
OtE, (OR=1.65); 
Extraversion 
(OR=0.65); 
Persistence 
(OR=0.67); 
Positive 
reappraisals predict 
some types of 
CAM. 
CAM: Intrinsic 
self-regulatory 
style (OR =1.12); 
Active coping 
(OR= 1.11); 
Support seeking 
coping (OR= 
1.07); Herbal: 
Avoidant coping 
(OR= 1.06); 
Active coping 
(OR= 1.11) 
Intuitive 
thinking 
(β=.13; core 
knowledge 
confusions 
(β=.16) 
Ontological 
confusions, 
correlations 
ranging from 
r=.31 to 
r=.75 
Cognitions/traits 
NOT related to 
CAM use or 
belief 
SoC and 
current use 
of CAM 
Neuroticism, OtE, 
conscientiousness 
(r<.15) 
OtE (Asian 
students, β 
=.194) 
Total CAM 
use: 
positive 
affect (β 
=.025);  
CAM 
effectiveness: 
OtE (r=-.05); 
absorption 
(r=.07) 
	 	 Agreeableness 
(OR=1.06); 
Neurot. 
(OR=0.88); 
Conscient. 
(OR=0.94); Pos. 
reappraisals 
(OR=1.20); 
Lowering 
aspirations 
(OR=0.86) 
CAM use: 
Avoidant coping 
OR= 0.99; 
Acceptance 
coping OR= 0.93; 
Need for cognition 
OR=1.02; Various 
motiv. types 
OR=1.01 to 
OR=0.96;  
/ / 
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Table P2, part 3. Summary of the studies included in the review. 
Authors Lo-Fo-Wong, 
et al.  
Lombart, K. Olchowska-
Kotsala, 
Saher, & 
Lindeman 
Sirois Sirois & Gick Smith,et al. Svedholm & 
Lindeman 
Takeda et al.  Tarhanet al. Won 
Year 2012 2002 2013 2005 2008 2002 2008 2013 2012 2011 2014 
Country Nether-lands USA Poland Finland Canada Canada USA Finland Japan Turkey USA 
Setting Secondary 
care, cancer 
University, gen. 
public 
Secondary 
care, cancer 
School, 
university, 
gen. public 
Online Orthodox 
medicine 
health 
offices/clinics, 
compl. 
medicine 
health 
offices/clinics 
University Secondary 
school 
Secondary care, 
cancer 
Secondary care, 
cancer 
Gen. public 
Population Dutch female 
breast cancer 
patients 
Students, gen. 
public 
Polish cancer 
patients 
Students, gen. 
public in 
Finland 
Arthritis, IBS, 
mixed chronic 
conditions 
patients 
CAM users 
and non-CAM 
users 
US 
undergrad. 
students 
Secondary 
school 
students in 
Finland 
Gynecologic 
cancer patients 
in Japan 
Oncology patients 
in Turkey 
Gen. public 
Sample 
size 
176 160 49 3261 365 199 276 102 420 220 100 
Study 
aims 
Socio-
demographic, 
clinical, and 
psychological 
predictors of 
CAM use 
Psychological 
and 
demographic 
correlates of 
perceived 
efficacy and use 
of 
unconventional 
therapies (UT) 
Whether 
personality, 
cognitive 
preferences, 
and 
paranormal 
beliefs predict 
willingness to 
use CAM 
Do intuitive 
thinking, 
paranormal 
beliefs, 
magical 
food/health 
beliefs, values 
and sex 
predict CAM 
beliefs. 
Studying the 
socio-
demographic, 
health-related, 
and 
psychosocial 
correlates of 
CAM use 
Whether health 
beliefs, socio-
demographic, 
medical, and 
personality 
factors 
predicted 
CAM use. 
To study 
individual 
difference in 
personality in 
willingness to 
use CAM 
Whether 
ontological 
confusions 
and cognitive 
style were 
associated 
with ratings of 
CAM 
effectiveness 
Characteristics, 
perceptions and 
attitudes of 
cancer patients 
to Kampo 
medicines 
Whether disease 
state, 
sociodemographics 
psychological 
conditions and QoL 
predict CAM use 
Traits, 
thinking 
style, rel. 
with CAM 
use/belief 
Design Cross-
sectional 
(correlational) 
and long’l 
Correlational, 
cross-sectional 
Correlational, 
cross-
sectional 
Correlational, 
cross-
sectional 
Correlational, 
cross-
sectional 
Quasi 
experimental 
comparison, 
cross sectional 
Correlational, 
cross-
sectional 
Correlational, 
cross-
sectional; 
longitudinal 
Quasi 
experimental 
comparison, 
cross-sectional 
Quasi-
experimental, 
cross-sectional 
Correlational, 
cross-
sectional 
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Table P2, part 4. Summary of the studies included in the review. 
Authors Lo-Fo-Wong 
et al. 
Lombart Olchowska-Kotsala Saher & 
Lindeman 
Sirois. Sirois & Gick Smith et al. Svedholm & 
Lindeman 
Takeda et al. Tarhan et al.  Won 
Outcome 
measure 
Provider –
directed CAM 
use, self-
directed 
CAM, self-
directed CAM 
use 6 moths 
follow-up. 
Number of 
UT tried. 
Willingness to use 
CAM in 
hypothetical 
situations. 
Self-
reported 
belief in 
efficacy of 
CAM. 
Self-reported 
CAM use. 
Self-reported CAM 
use (Orthodox 
medicine (non-
CAM), new or 
infrequent CAM use, 
established CAM 
use). 
Willingness to use 
CAM. 
Ratings of 
CAM 
effectiveness. 
Whether 
users, or 
non-users of 
Kampo/ 
dietary 
supplements 
Self-reported 
CAM use. 
 Self-reported 
CAM use/ 
attitude to 
CAM. 
Outcome 
measure tested 
for reliability 
and validity? 
Int. 
consistency, 
content 
validity 
Not tested. Internal consistency Internal 
consistency 
Not tested. Not tested. Content validity and 
internal consistency. 
internal 
consistency. 
Not tested Not tested.  Internal 
reliability, 
test-retest. 
Analysis  Regression. Regression. Regression Regression Regression. Comparisons. Regression. simple 
correlations 
Multivariate 
risk ratio 
Simple group 
comparisons. 
  
Cognitions/traits 
related to CAM 
use or belief 
OtE & 
provider 
CAM, 
(OR=1.14), 
OtE & self-
CAM 6 
months 
(OR=1.11). 
OtE (β=.296). Emotionality 
(β=.48), Rationality 
(β=.45), 
Neuroticism 
(β=.47), Extra’n 
(β=.46), OtE (β= -
.53). 
Intuitive 
thinking 
r=.33 
Perceived 
health control 
(OR=1.47); 
reward motiv. 
(OR=1.56); 
health due to 
chance 
(OR=0.81); 
emotion 
coping 
(OR=0.65). 
OtE scores higher in 
new & infrequent 
CAM users 
(M=6.44, SD=2.36) 
than non-CAM 
users, (M=5.20, 
SD=2.38). 
OtE rel. CAM 
(β=.225); Spirituality 
rel. with CAM & 
spirituality- therapies 
(β=.274); mood 
attention ass with 
CAM & spirituality- 
therapies (β=.182). 
Ontological 
confusions 
(r=.22); 
Intuitive 
thinking 
(r=.37). 
Trait anxiety 
(risk ratio, 
1.46) 
/  Rel. to CAM 
use: OtE 
(B=.23); 
Emot. intell. 
(B=-.27; .20); 
Intuitive 
thinking 
(B=.22). 
Rel. to CAM 
attitude: Sex 
(B=.29) 
Cognitions/traits 
NOT related to 
CAM use or 
belief 
Perceived 
control & 
self-CAM 6 
months 
(OR=0.92). 
Neurot. (r=-
.08), 
Compliance 
(r=.03), 
Humility 
(r=.03), 
Extra’n 
(r=.16), Int. 
LoC (r=.05). 
Intuition (β=.04), 
Creativity (β=-.05), 
Conscientiousness 
(β=.12), 
Agreeableness 
(β=.30). 
Rational 
thinking 
r=.00. 
/ Group comparisons 
not significant on 
neuro’m., extra’n, 
agreeableness and 
conscientiousness, 
int. LoC and ext. 
LoC. 
Neurot’m, Extra., 
Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, 
Mood Clarity, Mood 
Repair, optimism, 
religiousness. 
Need for 
cognition 
(r=.12); 
Actively 
open-minded 
thinking (r=-
.19). 
/ State/trait 
anxiety 
(STAI), CAM 
users M=43.7 
(SD=8.0), 
non-CAM 
users M=44.3 
(SD=8.2). 
 Not rel. to 
CAM 
attitude: OtE 
(B=.08);  
Intuitive 
thinking 
(B=.16). 
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Figure P1. PRISMA flow diagram of search process. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction to the thesis 
 
The nature of CAM 
Complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) encompasses many treatments 
outside conventional healthcare, including acupuncture, aromatherapy, chiropractic, 
healing, herbal medicine, homoeopathy, hypnosis, massage, meditation, nutritional 
therapy, reflexology, reiki, and yoga (Zollman & Vickers, 1999). In England, a large 
household survey showed that 44.0% of respondents have used CAM in their 
lifetime, 26.3% in the last 12 months and that 12.1% had consulted with a CAM 
practitioner within the preceding 12 months (Hunt, Coelho, Wider, Perry, Hung, 
Terry & Ernst, 2010).  
 
The incidence of CAM use is similar in the US (Eisenberg, Davis, Ettner, Appel, 
Wilkey, Van Rompay & Kessler, 1998) and may even be higher in East Asia (Harris, 
Cooper, Relton & Thomas, 2012). However, as the statistics show, CAM use is not 
universal; many choose not to use such treatments. This raises questions about 
which kinds of people are most likely to believe in and use CAM. 
 
Who uses CAM and why 
The most commonly reported motivations for CAM use are as remedies for chronic 
conditions (Eisenberg et al. 1998), but CAM is also used for less serious conditions, 
for health promotion and disease prevention (Yamashita, Tsukayama & Sugishita, 
2002) and for health maintenance (Lim, Sadarangani, Chan & Heng, 2005).  
 
In addition to health status, demographics are important predictors of CAM use. A 
systematic review shows that female and younger cancer patients - and in Western 
countries, those with higher incomes and more years of education - use CAM more. 
In Turkey and in Hawaii however, CAM use was related with lower income (Verhoef, 
Balneaves, Boon & Vroegindewey, 2005), perhaps as it is less costly than orthodox 
medicine. A review of the general population and medical professionals (Frass, 
Strassl, Friehs, Müllner, Kundi  & Kaye, 2012) supports these sex and income effects, 
but (in contrast to Verhoef et al., 2005) found higher CAM use in older people. A 
Taiwanese survey found that demographics differed depending on whether CAM 
use was for health maintenance (e.g. male, fewer years of education) or illness 
treatment (e.g. lower income) (Wu, Chou, Chen, Chen, Yeh & Lin, 2012). In their US 
review, Barnes, Bloom and Nahin (2008) found that native American and white 
adults were more likely to use CAM than Asian and black adults. 
 
Psychological factors in CAM use/belief 
Attitudes and beliefs also play a role both in CAM use and also faith in CAM (i.e. 
faith in whether CAM is effective as a treatment). A review of CAM use in type 2 
diabetes suggests beliefs and attitudes are more important predictors than 
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demographics (Chang, Wallis & Tiralongo, 2012). In their systematic review, Bishop, 
Yardley and Lewith (2007) found that a collaborative and participative approach to 
health, active coping, perceptions of illness causality (e.g. diet, stress), 
unconventional life philosophies (e.g. post-materialism) and spirituality, all predicted 
CAM use. Elsewhere, negative attitudes to conventional medication (Hsiao, Wong, 
Kanouse, Collins, Liu, Andersen, ... & Wenger, 2003), holistic philosophy toward 
health (Astin, 1998), modern health worries and mistrust of conventional science and 
orthodox medicine (Furnham, 2007; Jeswani & Furnham, 2010; Vincent & Furnham, 
1996) have all been demonstrated as predictors of CAM use. CAM use/belief has 
also been shown to associate with belief in the paranormal (Jeswani & Furnham, 
2010; Van den Bulck & Custers, 2009). 
 
So beliefs and attitudes have been reliably shown to predict CAM use and CAM 
beliefs. However, other psychological factors such as cognition and personality have 
also been explored as predictors of CAM use/belief. A recent systematic review by 
the author (see Preliminary Chapter) established firstly that openness to experience 
(hereafter OtE; being imaginative, unconventional and willing to consider new 
ideas) predicted use of CAM (e.g. Honda & Jacobson, 2005; Lombart, 2002) and to 
a lesser degree, belief in the effectiveness of CAM (Won, 2014). Secondly, the 
review concluded that intuitive thinking (rapid, instinctive, effortless thought) reliably 
predicted belief in CAM effectiveness (e.g. Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013; Won, 
2014). In contrast, a propensity for rational (analytical, effortful) thought did not 
predict CAM beliefs (nor CAM use). Thirdly, the review identified another correlate 
of CAM beliefs: ontological mistakes (e.g. Lindeman, 2011). Ontology concerns our 
understanding of the rules and categories which define our reality. A number of 
studies have shown that confusion of these categories, such as muddling the 
distinctions between physical and mental phenomena (e.g. thoughts blocking 
energy) or between sentient and non-sentient entities (e.g. assigning intentionality 
to internal organs), is more likely in people who believe in the effectiveness of CAM. 
 
The current thesis 
The systematic review reported in the preliminary chapter highlights empirical 
studies relevant to CAM use/belief. In particular, it suggested a role for cognitive 
bias in the development of CAM beliefs and use. Cognitive biases are heuristics or 
mental short-cuts which people systematically rely on to make decisions and draw 
conclusions, often when the demands of a task exceed cognitive processing 
capacity (Evans, 1989; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich & West, 2008; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1975). If intuitive thinking and ontological confusions are related to 
CAM beliefs/use, it suggests that these biases are partly responsible for the 
development or at least the maintenance of belief in CAM. The wider research 
evidence is in line with this notion: intuitive thinking and ontological confusions are 
associated not only with CAM beliefs, but also other non-scientific beliefs relating to 
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the paranormal (Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen & Lipsanen, 2015; Lobato, 
Mendoza, Sims & Chin, 2014) and pseudoscience (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, 
Koehler & Fugelsang, 2015).  
 
From the systematic review in the Preliminary Chapter, three separate empirical 
investigations were suggested. The first was the development of a measure of CAM 
belief and use. Although some questionnaires on CAM belief/use already exist, the 
rigor of validity and reliability testing to which they have been subjected is variable 
and indeed some measures have questionable validity (Bishop, Yardley & Lewith, 
2005; Finnigan, 1991; Hyland, Lewith & Westoby, 2003; Lindeman, 2011). 
Furthermore, in general these questionnaires do not distinguish between different 
forms of CAM, which is a particular focus of the current thesis given that CAM is a 
heterogeneous phenomenon. It is plausible that psychological variables might 
correlate with belief in some forms of CAM but not all. Study 1 therefore reports on 
the development and testing of a questionnaire measuring belief in different forms 
of CAM and also CAM use. 
 
The second investigation suggested by the systematic review was the relation 
between intuitive thinking and CAM belief/use. The studies identified in our review, 
all tested intuitive thinking with self-report thinking questionnaires. The 
disadvantage of such measures is that they might not offer an accurate insight into 
the person’s actual thinking styles, in effect, they measure what people believe (or 
want) their thinking style to be, not necessarily what it actually is. Furthermore, self-
report measures of thinking style do not necessarily correlate well with performance 
measures of thinking (Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright & Farrelly, 2004). Thus 
studies 2 and 3 will examine whether the previously found relationships between 
CAM belief/use and intuitive thinking are replicated on performance measures of 
thinking such as the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) and base rate 
neglect problems (Bar-Hillel, 1980). These test how willing or able people are to 
override an initial, intuitive response to a problem and engage in more effortful, 
analytical thought to solve the problem. Unlike self-report measures of thinking, 
measures such as the CRT test people’s actual thinking rather than their 
assumptions of how they think.  
 
The third empirical investigation suggested by our review relates to ontological 
mistakes, which are not only associated with belief in CAM (Lindeman, 2011; 
Lindeman & Saher, 2007; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013) but also with intuitive 
thinking (Lindeman, 2011; Pennycook et al., 2015). These findings raise the question 
of whether ontological mistakes are a system 1 heuristic process - a cognitive bias 
that people fallback onto when system 2, analytical processing is too difficult. And 
correspondingly, whether the ability to detect such mistakes requires system 2 
processing (slow, effortful, analytic; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). If this is the case, it 
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suggests a cognitive mechanism by which ontological mistakes – and in turn belief 
in CAM - might become more likely. Using reasoning paradigms, studies 4-5 will 
test the question of whether noticing ontological mistakes is a system 2, analytic 
process. More specifically, these studies will explore whether people’s ability to 
notice ontological in/correctness diminishes when cognitive processing is made 
more difficult. The syllogistic belief bias paradigm (e.g. Evans, Barston & Pollard, 
1983; Markovitz & Nantel, 1989) provides a method for testing this. It is well 
established that believability biases people’s assessments of logical validity when 
they attempt to solve syllogisms, because awareness of believable and unbelievable 
statements requires very little cognitive capacity and thus beliefs can interfere even 
when one is simultaneously engaged in reasoning. We will use the belief bias 
paradigm to test the hypothesis that (unlike believability) ontological correctness 
does not bias responding on difficult syllogisms, because difficult reasoning 
expends the cognitive capacity required to notice said mistakes. 
 
The relevance of these studies to health psychology 
By placing faith in CAM, people are potentially investing in therapies which have 
questionable scientific credibility and/or a limited evidence base for their 
effectiveness (Angell & Kassirer, 1998; Barnes, 2003). If the effectiveness of certain 
forms of CAM is unsupported by evidence, then such investment is misguided, 
potentially wasting time, money and in some cases diverting patients away from 
orthodox, evidence-based treatments (Talalay & Talalay, 2001). By understanding 
the role that cognitive factors play in CAM beliefs, we are in a better position to 
design interventions to educate people about CAM and to help them make 
informed health decisions. Indeed, evidence suggests that the targeting of 
cognitions can be effective in health behavior change (Albarracın, McNatt, Klein, 
Ho, Mitchell & Kumkale, 2003; Bandura, 1989; Decruyenaere, Evers-Kiebooms, 
Welkenhuysen, Denayer & Claes, 2000; Hadjistavropoulos, Craig & 
Hadjistavropoulos, 1998; Peters McCaul, Stefanek & Nelson, 2006). Thus the 
following series of studies sets out to uncover new knowledge about the cognitive 
biases that are associated with belief in and use of CAM. 
  
	 28	
Chapter 2. Development and testing of a new measure of 
CAM beliefs and CAM use. 
 
The author and colleagues recently conducted a systematic review (see Preliminary 
Chapter) of the cognitions and traits associated with belief in and use of CAM. In 
reviewing this literature, it was noted that studies had employed a range of 
measures for CAM belief and use. Mostly these measures had been designed by 
the authors for their own studies but had apparently not been subjected to tests of 
validity and reliability.  
 
Due to the absence of a commonly-used and widely tested measure of CAM 
beliefs, it was decided that a new measure of attitudes to CAM would be designed 
to suit the requirements of the current research. This would also allow the author to 
rigorously test the new measure. 
 
Existing measures of CAM 
 A number of measures of CAM belief have been developed, but these vary in 
emphasis and in the degree to which they have been tested for reliability and 
validity. The complementary and alternative medicine beliefs inventory (CAMBI; 
Bishop, Yardley & Lewith, 2005) is a valid and internally consistent 17-item measure, 
encompassing three dimensions of belief: beliefs in natural treatments, beliefs 
around participation in treatment and beliefs about a holistic approach to health. 
However, the CAMBI does not measure beliefs about the effectiveness of different 
forms of CAM, rather it measures more general attitudes about CAM. Mike Hyland 
and colleagues developed the the 11-item holistic complementary and alternative 
medicine questionnaire (HCAMQ; Hyland, Lewith & Westoby, 2003). This too 
contains a ‘beliefs about holistic health’ subscale as well as a subscale pertaining to 
the scientific validity of CAM. It has good internal reliability and validity but 
questionable external validity. The question-mark over external validity arises 
because the holistic health subscale failed to distinguish between patients from a 
CAM clinic and patients attending a conventional hospital. Furthermore, as with the 
CAMBI, the HCAMQ does not measure beliefs about the effectiveness of different 
forms of CAM. Finnigan (1991) has developed a unitary measure of CAM beliefs. 
Finnigan’s measure (the attitude towards alternative medicine scale; AAMS) reflects 
general attitudes towards CAM, but has questionable convergent validity. The 
CAMBI, the HCAMQ and the AAMS, all encompass general philosophies common 
to CAM, such as a holistic approach to health or participation in healthcare. 
However, the emphasis of these scales does not capture beliefs about CAM 
effectiveness per se. As the aim of the current research was to test attitudes towards 
the effectiveness of CAM as treatment for illness, the foci of the aforementioned 
questionnaires were inappropriate.  
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The CAM health belief questionnaire (CHBQ; Lie & Boker, 2004) is a unitary 
measure of CAM beliefs but is designed for trainee health professionals and is 
therefore unsuitable for the current research. Lindeman (2011) developed a scale 
testing for belief in the effectiveness of various complementary and alternative 
medicines (BCAM). However, it would require further testing for validity and 
reliability, as currently there is no published data on the validity or reliability of this 
scale. Furthermore, although Lindeman’s BCAM does gather attitudes on a diverse 
range of CAM, it derives a unitary score and does not distinguish between the 
different forms of CAM. 
 
For the current study, it is desirable to distinguish between different forms of CAM. 
Indeed, evidence suggests that people’s faith in CAM effectiveness varies as a 
function of familiarity with the particular CAM approach in question (Furnham, 
2000). After all, CAM is heterogeneous and use of one form of CAM does not entail 
use of all (Honda & Jacobson, 2005; LaCaille & Kuvaas, 2011; Smith, Dalen, 
Wiggins, Christopher, Bernard & Shelley, 2008). Furthermore, different forms of 
CAM vary with regard to the veracity of the research evidence which underpins 
them. For example, meditation is a recognized form of CAM, yet it also forms a 
central feature of mindfulness-based psychological interventions which have been 
shown to bring clinical benefit (for reviews see: Goyal, Singh, Sibinga, Gould, 
Rowland-Seymour, Sharma, ... & Ranasinghe, 2014; Keng, Smoski & Robins, 2011). 
In contrast, the research evidence on homeopathy for example, suggests that it 
yields no clinical benefit above that of placebo (e.g. Ernst, 2002). CAM is a 
heterogeneous set of approaches and there is evidence that beliefs predict CAM 
use. As none of the existing measures of CAM beliefs are designed to 1) test beliefs 
about CAM effectiveness and 2) distinguish between attitudes to different forms of 
CAM, it was decided that a new measure would be designed for these purposes. 
 
Study 1. Measure development and testing 
 
Aims 
Study 1 will test the validity and reliability of a newly developed questionnaire which 
measures use of and belief in CAM (the working title of this new measure will be the 
Attitudes to Complementary and Alternative Medicine scale (ACAM)). More 
specifically, the questionnaire will be subjected to tests of internal consistency, face 
validity, content validity, and construct validity in a sample containing students and 
members of the general public. 
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Testing the internal structure of the ACAM 
An exploratory principal components analysis (PCA) will be conducted to test for the 
internal integrity of the ACAM. Internal consistency will be assessed using 
Cronbach’s alpha. 
 
Face validity and content validity. 
The content of items for the ACAM will be informed by relevant literature on 
different categories of CAM (Honda & Jacobson, 2005; Smith, Wiggins, 
Christopher, Bernard & Shelley, 2008; the USA’s National Centre for 
Complementary and Integrative Health (NIH), 2015, 15 September). 
 
Construct validity (divergent and convergent validity) 
Two forms of construct validity will be tested: divergent and convergent validity. 
Divergent validity will be evaluated by comparing ACAM scores across five different 
groups of respondent: pharmacy students, psychology students, nursing students, 
humanities students and people from the general population. Studies suggest that 
psychology students are generally critical of CAM (Ditte, Schulz, Ernst & Schmid-
Ott, 2011). Others have reported that pharmacy students are most likely to believe 
that orthodox medicines are beneficial and not harmful and humanities students 
more likely to believe that orthodox medicines are over-prescribed (Horne, Frost, 
Hankins & Wright, 2001). One would therefore expect pharmacy students to be less 
supportive of non-pharmacological treatments. However, there is also evidence that 
pharmacy and nursing students can have positive views toward CAM (Kreitzer, 
Mitten, Harris & Shandeling, 2002; Yildirim, Parlar, Eyigor, Sertoz, Eyigor, Fadiloglu, 
& Uyar, 2010). It is expected then that psychology students will have lower scores 
on the ACAM than the other student groups and the general population.  
 
Convergent validity: if the ACAM is measuring beliefs about the effectiveness of 
CAM, then it should correlate with other similar measures. To test this, it is expected 
that the ACAM will be positively correlated with: 
 
1) Lindeman’s (2011) BCAM 
2) Scores on the importance of psychological factors in physical illness and the 
harmful effects of orthodox medicine from Vincent, Furnham and Willsmore’s, 
(1995) Attitudes to Science and Medicine scale (ASM) 
 
And negatively correlated with: 
 
3) Scores on the scientific basis for medicine from Vincent et al.’s (1995) ASM 
4) Finnigan’s (1991) AAMS (NB high AAMS scores reflect negative attitudes to 
CAM). 
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Method 
 
Participants 
All participants were 17 or over, and able to read and speak in English. There were 
277 participants in total (51 males) collected through opportunity sampling. The 
sample included University of Wolverhampton undergraduate students (from a 
range of academic disciplines) and members of the general population. The general 
population participants comprised non-academic staff from the university of 
Wolverhampton, and people from communities in the West Midlands. Table 2.1 
displays characteristics of the sample, which is mostly university educated and 
mostly young: the mean age is 26 but the median age is 20 (range from 17-81). The 
sample was gathered with a view to representing people from science and medical 
backgrounds (pharmacy and psychology) and non-science (humanities, general 
population) backgrounds.  
 
Group Mean 
Age 
Sec. 
Sch. 
Vocat. Some 
Uni. 
Bachelor Master’s Doctoral Total Missing 
Gen. 39y 4m 
(16y 8m) 
14 4 8 8 1 0 35 0 
Psychol. 22y 8m 
(5y 11m) 
0 0 133 1 0 1 135 0 
Pharm. 22y 1m 
(5y 4m) 
0 0 30 1 0 0 31 2 
Human. 20y 9m 
(3y 11m) 
0 0 13 2 0 0 15 1 
Nursing 32y 5m 
(20y 6m) 
3 4 33 11 0 0 51 7 
Total 26y 8m 
(13y 5m) 
17 8 217 23 1 1 267 10 
Table 2.1. Study 1: Mean age (standard deviations in parentheses) and level of education as a 
function of group. 
 
Design 
Tests of divergent validity compared five groups (pharmacy students, psychology 
students, nursing students, humanities students and the general public) on the 
ACAM. Tests of convergent validity correlated the ACAM with other scales from the 
research literature. A principal components analysis, with varimax rotation was 
conducted on the ACAM items to establish the structure of the questionnaire. 
 
Materials 
The Attitudes to Complementary and Alternative Medicine scale (ACAM). The 
measure presents questions about beliefs in the effectiveness of various types of 
CAM for a range of conditions. Five types of CAM were chosen and categorised in 
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line with Honda and Jacobson (2005), Smith, Wiggins, Christopher, Bernard and 
Shelley (2008) and also the USA’s National Centre for Complementary and 
Integrative Health (NIH, 2015, 15 September). They are: energy medicines (such as 
acupuncture and Reiki, medicines which unblock or channel types of energy that are 
said to exist on the body); herbalism or natural products (therapies which make use 
of plants, seeds, roots, flowers, vitamins and minerals); alternative whole medical 
systems (holistic systems of theory and practice which are outside orthodox 
biopsychosocial medicine such as homeopathy and naturopathy); body 
manipulation (such as osteopathic or chiropractic manipulation and also massage); 
mind-body techniques (therapies which attempt to restore balance between the 
mind and the body including meditation, relaxation, yoga, tai chi and the Alexander 
technique). Descriptions and examples of each were provided. For each of the five 
CAM categories, six questions ask about its effectiveness for particular uses: serious 
conditions; non-serious conditions; long-term conditions; general wellbeing; 
psychological problems; preventing illness. These six questions are measured on a 
five-point Likert scale (not at all effective to very effective). For example: 
 
How effective are energy medicines in treating serious conditions such as cancer, 
heart attacks or pneumonia? 
Not at all effective Very effective 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
For each of the five CAM categories, there was also a question on how much 
respondents know about the respective form of CAM. Finally, the questionnaire 
asks participants to indicate how often they have used each of the five categories of 
CAM in the last 12 months (never, once, monthly, weekly, daily).  
 
The following three questionnaires were included to enable tests of convergent 
validity with the ACAM. 
 
Attitudes to alternative medicine scale (AAMS). Finnigan’s (1991) attitudes to 
alternative medicine scale presents 14 items which provide either positive (e.g. 
Alternative medicine produces longer lasting and more complete results) or 
negative statements (e.g. Alternative medicines are merely a financial con trick.) 
about CAM. Responses are measured on a six-point Likert scale ranging from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree. Higher scores represent negative attitudes to 
CAM (after reverse scoring positive items).  
 
Belief in CAM (BCAM).  Lindeman’s (2011) belief in CAM measure asks respondents 
to rate the effectiveness of 12 types of CAM e.g. Energy healing (treatments of 
blockages within the energy channels or meridians in the body, such as Shiatsu) on 
a five-point scale, ranging from not at all effective to very effective. There is also a 
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‘can’t say’ option. This is a unitary measure where higher scores represent stronger 
beliefs in CAM effectiveness. 
 
Attitudes to science and medicine (ASM). Vincent et al.’s (1995) attitudes to science 
and medicine scale presents 12 statements about science and orthodox medicine 
(e.g. Medicine is a science and should be based on rigorous scientific principles). 
The questionnaire has three subscales: the scientific basis for medicine, the 
importance of psychological factors in physical illness and the harmful effects of 
orthodox medicine.  The response format is a five-point scale from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree.  
 
Demographic questions (sex, age, education) were also incorporated. 
 
Procedure 
The materials were administered face-to-face in paper form.  Participants were all 
instructed to complete the materials without discussing their answers with others. 
Data was gathered from students at the end of classes. Respondents from the 
general public were tested in various settings either one-to-one or in groups of up 
to 12. All participants were verbally debriefed when they finished their participation.  
 
Results 
 
Item analysis 
Item analysis was conducted on the five CAM categories (AWMS, energy medicines, 
body manipulation, herbalism, mind and body). For each category of CAM, the six 
items included were those relating to serious conditions, non-serious conditions, 
long-term conditions, wellbeing, psychological problems, preventing future illness. 
Two further item analyses were conducted for CAM for serious conditions and CAM 
knowledge items.  In total then, seven subscales were selected for item analysis. For 
each of these seven subscales, a high (top quartile) and a low (bottom quartile) 
scoring group was formed. The groups were then compared on each item from the 
subscale at hand. The mean difference between the groups on each item was 
divided by the range of the response scale minus 1 (i.e. 5 - 1 = 4). The resulting 
discrimination index could range from 0 to 1, with any index equal to or above .2 
indicative of good discrimination. All items produced a good discrimination index (³ 
.29). 
 
Principal components analysis 
A principal components analysis (PCA) was conducted on 30 of the items from the 
Attitudes to Complementary and Alternative Medicine scale (ACAM). More 
specifically, for each of the five CAM categories (AWMS, energy medicines, body 
manipulation, herbalism, mind and body), the six items on the effectiveness of the 
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therapy for different purposes were included (serious conditions, non-serious 
conditions, long-term conditions, wellbeing, psychological problems, preventing 
future illness). Items on CAM knowledge and on CAM use were not included in the 
PCA.  
 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value was .89 and confirmed the sampling adequacy 
for the analysis (de Vaus, 1991). Bartlett’s test for sphericity was highly significant, (p 
< .001) indicating that the inter-item correlations were sufficiently large for PCA. 
Factor extraction was based on the Kaiser-Guttman criterion of eigenvalues > 1. 
Factor loadings less than .3 were suppressed. Following orthogonal (varimax) 
rotation, all items loaded onto at least one factor. The resultant seven factors 
accounted for 68.00% of the variance. Items which loaded onto more than one 
factor were considered for removal, unless one of the factor loadings clearly 
surpassed the others. The criterion was that multiple factor loadings would be 
tolerated if the highest factor loading was at least 100% greater than the next 
largest. For example, the item on mind-body techniques for general wellbeing 
loaded onto factors 3 and 4, but as the factor 4 loading was .71 and the factor 3 
loading was only .31, this item was retained for factor 4.  
 
As shown in Table 2.2, after inspection of the factor loadings, only four factors were 
retained. Factor 1 comprised items exclusively on AWMS relating to its effectiveness 
for a) non-serious conditions, b) long-term conditions, c) wellbeing and d) 
preventing future illness. Factors 2 and 4 retained the same items but for energy 
medicines and mind-body approaches respectively. Factor 3 comprised three items 
exclusively on herbalism relating to its effectiveness for a) non-serious conditions, b) 
wellbeing and c) preventing future illness. 
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Item Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
AWMS wellbeing .829       
AWMS preventative .809       
AWMS non-serious .775       
AWMS long-term .745       
AWMS psychological .697      .448 
AWMS serious .591     .385  
Energy wellbeing  .761      
Energy non-serious  .736      
Energy preventative  .690      
Energy long-term  .686      
Energy serious .318 .492    .469  
Herbalism preventative   .795     
Herbalism wellbeing   .775     
Herbalism non-serious   .753     
Mind-Body preventative    .744    
Mind-Body wellbeing   .305 .707    
Mind-Body non-serious    .680 .309   
Mind-Body long-term    .635    
Mind-Body psychological   .426 .500   .420 
Body Manip. wellbeing   .300  .718   
Body Manip. preventative    .331 .696   
Body Manip. non-serious     .654 .400  
Body Manip. 
psychological 
    .534  .525 
Body Manip. long-term  .306   .487   
Body Manip. serious     .368 .705  
Herbalism serious .315  .417   .605  
Herbalism long-term   .518   .573  
Mind-Body serious    .532  .540  
Energy psychological  .565     .645 
Herbalism psychological   .492    .572 
Table 2.2. Study 1: ACAM factor loadings after rotation. Note: items in bold are deemed to load 
predominantly onto one factor. The two body manipulation items in bold and italics load 
predominantly onto one factor but a factor with fewer than three items is unstable. 
 
Factor 5 (containing items on body manipulation) was not retained as only two of its 
items clearly loaded onto one factor and factors with two or fewer items are 
considered unstable (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Factors 6-7 were not retained as 
they contained items with multiple factor loadings of similar magnitude, or the items 
had much higher factor loadings on another factor. 
 
In summary, four factors emerged relating to specific types of CAM and their 
effectiveness for wellbeing, illness prevention, non-serious and long-term conditions 
respectively. Thus items on CAM for serious and psychological problems were not 
retained following factor analysis. However, ‘CAM for serious conditions’ is an 
important construct theoretically, as it arguably reflects a more extreme faith in the 
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effectiveness of CAM. Given its theoretical importance, it was decided that the 
‘CAM for serious conditions’ construct should be further tested as a discrete 
category. 
 
Internal consistency 
 
Before removal of weak items 
Cronbach’s alpha was computed for the five CAM categories with all items 
included: AWMS (a = .88), energy (a = .83), body manipulation (a = .79), herbalism 
(a = .84), mind and body (a = .81). All alphas were acceptable to good, but in three 
cases (AWMS, mind and body and energy medicines) alpha was improved slightly 
by removal of either the serious conditions item or the psychological problems item.  
Two further alphas were conducted: for CAM for serious conditions (a = .76);  and 
CAM knowledge items (a = .57), where removal of the AWMS item improved alpha 
to .72.  
 
After removal of weak items 
Further Cronbach’s alphas were conducted on the reduced subscales suggested by 
the factor analysis. Here, AWMS (a = .87), energy medicines (a = .84), herbalism (a 
= .81)  and mind and body (a = .79) all recorded acceptable to good alphas 
(corrected item-total correlations ³ .54) but in no cases would removal of further 
items improve alpha. 
 
In summary, the PCA suggests that the structure of the ACAM is best represented 
by subscales for four different types of CAM: AWMS, energy medicines, herbalism 
and mind and body (but not containing the body manipulation items). The 
Cronbach’s alpha analyses confirm the internal integrity of these four subscales, 
whilst also supporting the internal consistency of a CAM for serious conditions 
subscale and a CAM knowledge subscale (with the knowledge about AWMS 
removed). The items comprising the reduced ACAM are shown in Table 2.3. 
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Energy 
medicines 
How effective are energy medicines in treating non-serious conditions such as 
common cold, hay fever or menstrual problems? 
How effective are energy medicines for treating long-term conditions such as back-
pain, asthma and arthritis 
How effective are energy medicines for maintaining general wellbeing? 
How effective are energy medicines for preventing future illness (i.e. keeping you 
healthy)? 
Herbalism 
& natural 
products 
How effective are herbalism or natural products in treating non-serious conditions 
such as common cold, hay fever or menstrual problems? 
How effective are herbalism or natural products for maintaining general wellbeing? 
How effective are herbalism or natural products for preventing future illness (i.e. 
keeping you healthy)? 
Alternative 
whole 
medical 
systems 
How effective are alternative whole medical systems in treating non-serious 
conditions such as common cold, hay fever or menstrual problems? 
How effective are alternative whole medical systems for treating long-term 
conditions such as back-pain, asthma and arthritis 
How effective are alternative whole medical systems for maintaining general 
wellbeing? 
How effective are alternative whole medical systems for preventing future illness (i.e. 
keeping you healthy)? 
Mind & 
body 
How effective are mind-body techniques in treating non-serious conditions such as 
common cold, hay fever or menstrual problems? 
How effective are mind-body techniques for treating long-term conditions such as 
back-pain, asthma and arthritis 
How effective are mind-body techniques for maintaining general wellbeing? 
How effective are mind-body techniques for preventing future illness (i.e. keeping 
you healthy)? 
CAM for 
serious 
conditions 
How effective are energy medicines in treating serious conditions such as cancer, 
heart attacks or pneumonia? 
How effective are herbalism or natural products in treating serious conditions such as 
cancer, heart attacks or pneumonia? 
How effective are alternative whole medical systems in treating serious conditions 
such as cancer, heart attacks or pneumonia? 
How effective is body manipulation in treating serious conditions such as cancer, 
heart attacks or pneumonia? 
How effective are mind-body techniques in treating serious conditions such as 
cancer, heart attacks or pneumonia? 
CAM 
knowledge 
How much do you know about mind-body techniques? 
How much do you know about herbalism or natural products? 
How much do you know about body manipulation? 
How much do you know about energy medicines? 
Table 2.3 Study 1: ACAM items retained following PCA and Cronbach’s alpha 
 
Construct Validity 
 
Divergent validity 
Divergent validity of the ACAM was tested by comparing groups of people who 
were predicted to differ in their beliefs and use of CAM. People from the general 
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population, humanities students, nursing students, psychology students and 
pharmacy students were compared on the ACAM (AWMS, energy medicines, 
herbalism, mind and body, CAM for serious conditions and CAM knowledge). 
 
Using a MANOVA, there was a significant multivariate effect of group on ACAM 
responses (Pillai’s Trace = .18; F(6, 24) = 1.65; p = .026; ph2 = .05). Following-up 
with univariate ANOVAs, the groups differed only on energy medicines (F(2, 208) = 
3.05; p = .018; ph2 = .06). Post-hoc (LSD) tests show nursing students scoring higher 
on this measure than the general population (p = .018), psychology (p = .002) and 
pharmacy (p = .042) but not humanities (p = .109). The means and standard 
deviations for the groups on energy medicines are displayed in Table 2.4. 
 
 N AWMS Energy Mind Herbalism Serious Knowledge 
General 
population 
35 11.77 10.71 12.21 9.17 10.69 11.47 
(3.80) (4.41) (4.06) (3.29) (4.05) (3.89) 
Psychology 107 10.57 10.75 10.87 10.07 9.03 10.86 
(4.00) (3.94) (3.46) (2.63) (3.37) (2.93) 
Pharmacy 33 9.97 10.97 11.69 10.09 9.97 10.78 
(4.46) (3.71) (2.93) (2.02) (3.61) (2.87) 
Humanities 16 12.00 10.94 11.88 9.56 10.69 11.25 
(4.38) (2.98) (3.93) (3.16) (2.89) (2.46) 
Nursing 57 11.86 12.67 11.79 10.22 10.26 11.30 
(3.57) (3.36) (3.64) (2.53) (3.87) (2.86) 
Table 2.4. Study 1: Mean scores (with standard deviations in parentheses) on the ACAM subscales as 
a function of group. 
 
Convergent validity 
Convergent validity was tested by correlating the ACAM with existing measures. If 
the ACAM is indeed measuring attitudes to CAM, it should also correlate with 
existing tools which measure the same or similar constructs. The first measure was 
the Attitudes to science and medicine scale (ASM; Vincent et al., 1995), which has 
three subscales: the scientific basis for medicine, the importance of psychological 
factors in physical illness and the harmful effects of orthodox medicine. The second 
and third measures were both unitary scales of CAM beliefs: Lindeman’s (2011) 
Belief in CAM (BCAM) scale, and Finnigan’s (1991) Attitudes to Alternative Medicine 
scale (AAMS). 
 
As shown in Table 2.5, the ACAM subscales all had moderate correlations with the 
BCAM scale and weak to moderate relationships with the AAMS (high AAMS scores 
indicate low faith in alternative medicines, therefore correlations with the AAMS are 
negative). Regarding the ASM, belief in the psychological basis of illness showed 
weak to moderate relationships with four of the ACAM subscales (AWMS, energy 
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medicines, mind and body and knowledge). The other two ASM subscales (belief in 
the harmful effects of orthodox medicine and the scientific basis to medicine) mostly 
yielded weak relationships with the ACAM.  
 
The ACAM also measures use of CAM. Use of CAM was calculated by summing 
participants’ reports of CAM use for all five of the CAM categories originally 
included in the questionnaire (AWMS, energy medicines, herbalism, mind & body 
and body manipulation). As the measure of CAM use was not a linear scale (once, 
yearly, monthly, weekly, daily), it was correlated with other variables using a 
Spearman’s rho. As shown in Table 2.5, it produced moderate relationships with 
energy medicines and CAM knowledge and with Lindeman’s (2011) BCAM and also 
Finnigan’s (1991) AAMS. There were weaker relationships with Vincent et al.’s (1995) 
ASM and with the other ACAM subscales. Overall there was evidence that CAM use 
was at least moderately associated with CAM beliefs/attitudes. 
 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1.ASM Harm 13.57 2.37            
2.ASM Sci. 14.32 2.44 -.069           
3.ASM Psy. 15.83 2.25 .554** -.154          
4.AAMS 49.94 10.12 -.381** .477** -.440**         
5.BCAM 20.59 10.44 .145 -.114 .206 -.377**        
6.AWMS 10.63 4.59 .047 -.219 .281* -.439** .444**       
7.Energy 10.95 3.45 .227 -.189 .387** -.398** .525** .411**      
8.Mind/Body 11.59 3.38 .357** -.165 .431** -.337** .452** .363** .378**     
9.Herbalism 9.77 2.67 .148 -.058 .227 -.370** .355** .451** .333** .431**    
10.Know. 10.95 2.80 .179 -.088 .246 -.247 .279* .129 .204 .457** .437**   
11.Serious 10.05 3.59 .260* -.240 .186 -.431** .572** .646** .514** .344** .417** .242  
12.Use 4.63 4.10 .246 -.220 .291* -.494** .421** .242 .377** .267* .219 .372** .276* 
Table 2.5. Study 1: The Spearman rho correlations between ACAM subscales and other measures of 
CAM beliefs. ** significant at .01; * significant at .05. 
 
Discussion 
 
Scale structure and internal consistency 
A series of analyses have tested the internal structure and consistency as well as the 
construct validity of the ACAM. A principal components analysis of the five 
categories of CAM included in the original ACAM suggested four factors 
(components): alternative whole medical systems, energy medicines, herbalism and 
natural products and mind & body. The items comprising these factors were mostly 
those on the effectiveness for non-serious conditions, wellbeing, long-term 
conditions and preventing future illness. Items on CAM for psychological problems 
and on CAM for serious conditions did not load uniquely onto any factor. 
	 40	
 
However, the aim of this thesis is to explore psychological factors in beliefs about 
CAM. In this context, CAM for serious conditions is an important variable. Arguably, 
believing that CAM can help with serious conditions (such as cancer for example) 
represents a more radical faith, than believing that CAM can help with wellbeing, 
future illness and non-serious conditions. This is in line with the argument that some 
CAM users are committed devotees whereas other CAM users are casual adherents 
who shop around (see Bishop, Yardley & Lewith, 2007; Furnham & Kirkaldy, 1996). 
Although use of/belief in CAM might be due to things such as dissatisfaction with 
orthodox medicine or belief in healthy lifestyles (Furnham & Forey, 1994; Furnham, 
Vincent & Wood, 1995), CAM use is still strongly related to beliefs in its 
effectiveness to treat (Furnham & Kirkaldy, 1996). 
 
Believing that CAM is effective for serious conditions, requires greater faith in its 
potency as a treatment than do beliefs about CAM as a treatment for wellbeing, 
prevention, non-serious or even long-term conditions. Therefore, the CAM items 
suggested by the PCA, arguably represent more moderate beliefs about CAM. 
Given the aims of the thesis, it is believed that inclusion of CAM for serious 
conditions is theoretically important, as this subscale might have more power to 
tease out the psychological factors which underpin more extreme CAM beliefs. For 
this reason, the CAM for serious conditions subscale was considered for inclusion in 
the questionnaire.  
 
The items withdrawn from the measure were mostly those relating to body 
manipulation and to CAM for psychological problems. The psychological items 
appear not to relate exclusively to any one factor. This is somewhat surprising given 
that previous studies have shown that belief in the psychological basis of physical 
illness is related to CAM use (Furnham, 2007). However, the psychological items in 
the ACAM referred not to the psychological causes of illness but rather the 
effectiveness of CAM for treating psychological problems. 
 
It is argued here that the items retained for the ACAM are those most suited for 
exploring the psychological predictors of CAM beliefs/use in the current study. 
However, the items retained for the current sequence of studies, would not 
necessarily represent the finished measure. Firstly, the current measure is somewhat 
imbalanced: although the body manipulation items were excluded following the 
PCA, the body manipulation for serious conditions item was retained as part of the 
CAM for serious conditions factor. As all forms of CAM mentioned in the 
questionnaire are preceded by a brief description, this would mean that 
respondents would read a description of body manipulation treatments just for one 
item. For the sake of face validity, this item would likely be excluded from the 
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questionnaire in future if further testing (such as confirmatory factor analysis) 
supported the conclusions drawn here. 
 
Construct validity 
The tests of divergent validity were largely null. It was predicted that due to their 
training in science, students of psychology would show the least faith in CAM 
compared to other groups. These differences did not emerge, only on energy 
medicines was there a difference between the groups and here it was nursing 
students who had stronger beliefs than the other groups.  
 
No previous study had compared such a wide range of student groups. However, 
there is evidence that psychology and medical students have unfavourable views of 
CAM (Ditte, Schulz, Ernst & Schmid-Ott, 2011) and that medical training can make 
students more sceptical of CAM (Furnham & McGill, 2003). The lack of differences 
between the groups is perhaps consistent with other research though, which shows 
that attitudinal differences between social science students and medical students 
are small (Yardley, Fahmy, Jamie & Furnham, 1999). Numerous other studies also 
report that nursing and pharmacy students can have generally positive attitudes 
toward CAM (Kreitzer et al., 2002; Yildirim et al., 2010). One concludes therefore 
that the distinctions between different student groups and the general population 
were insufficient to elicit differences in attitude to CAM.  
 
This conclusion seems to be warranted more so than the conclusion that the ACAM 
is invalid, as the ACAM subscales generally correlated in the expected way with 
other measures of CAM beliefs. The correlations with the AAMS and the BACM 
indicate that the ACAM is indeed measuring attitudes to CAM effectiveness. 
 
Conclusions 
To support the conclusions drawn from the PCA in this study, a future study could 
collect further data on which to perform a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). This 
might include comparisons (based on the Akaike information criterion) of the 
reduced four factor structure reported above with other possible factor structures. It 
might be that different conclusions are drawn about the questionnaire’s structure 
following these follow-up analyses, whereby items rejected following the analyses 
reported in the current paper are reinstated. In summary, the ACAM’s structure, 
internal consistency and construct validity have been tested. The retention of four 
factors (AWMS, energy medicines, herbalism and mind & body) was suggested by a 
PCA; for theoretical reasons, items relating to CAM for serious conditions and CAM 
knowledge were also retained. These six subscales showed good internal 
consistency and also satisfactory convergent validity. This reduced scale will 
therefore be the dependent measure used in studies 2 and 3, which report findings 
on the psychological correlates of CAM beliefs (see Chapter 3). 
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Chapter 3. Exploring the relationship between CAM beliefs 
and reasoning 
 
Study 2. Performance measures of reasoning, CAM beliefs and CAM 
use 
One of the weaknesses of the literature identified in the systematic review 
(Preliminary Chapter), was that most of the studies which measured intuitive and 
rational thinking employed the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 
1999). This self-report measure is not a truly objective test of dual process thinking 
and does not correlate with common reasoning paradigms such as syllogisms or 
Wason’s Selection Task (Newstead et al., 2004). According to dual process theories 
of thinking (e.g. Evans & Stanovich, 2013), humans operate two systems of thought: 
system 1 is rapid, cognitively inexpensive and automatic; system 2 is slow, 
analytical, cognitively expensive and deliberate. Furthermore, humans are known to 
be cognitive misers: our minds default to system 1 thinking and this automatic 
response must be overridden by system 2 processing (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Kahneman, 2011). The cognitive reflection test (CRT) is a powerful test of people’s 
willingness or ability to resist appealing (but incorrect) automatic responses in favour 
of deliberate analytical reasoning (Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011). The CRT has 
been found to be an excellent predictor of performance on rational thinking tasks 
(Cokely & Kelly, 2009; Frederick, 2005) and explains variation in rational thinking 
independently of intelligence and executive functioning (Toplak et al., 2011). The 
purported relationship between intuitive/rational thinking and CAM beliefs would 
be more compelling if demonstrated with paradigms used in the reasoning 
literature such as the CRT.  
 
A recent study has shown that thinking style, as tested with cognitive tasks such as 
this, does indeed predict other types of belief (paranormal and religious) 
(Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler & Fugelsang, 2012). Furthermore, as CAM is 
often seen as separate from orthodox medicine and modern science (Furnham, 
2007), it was reasonable to ask whether faith in CAM would be weaker in those who 
analyse more and stronger in those who intuit more. 
 
Aims and predictions 
Study 2 will explore, in a sample of students, whether thinking style predicts CAM 
belief and CAM use. More specifically, this study will test whether the previously 
reported relationship between intuitive thinking and faith in CAM’s effectiveness is 
replicated when using a more robust cognitive test of thinking: the cognitive 
reflection test (CRT). Other important relationships with CAM use/belief will be 
tested. The following relationships are predicted: 
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A positive relationship between CAM belief/CAM use and: intuitive responding on 
the CRT; OtE; experiential (intuitive) thinking on the REI; 
 
A negative relationship between CAM belief/CAM use and rational thinking on the 
REI. 
 
Methodology 
 
Participants 
All participants (N = 125; 109 females) were 18 or over with a mean age of 22 years, 
4 months (SD = 5 years, 7 months), and able to read and speak in English. The 
respondents were all undergraduate psychology students at the University of 
Wolverhampton.  
 
Design and statistical analyses 
The study was correlational. The principal analyses were Pearson correlations 
followed by multiple linear regression. There were six regressions in total. The 
outcome variables in each regression were respectively 1) alternative whole medical 
systems, 2) Energy medicines, 3) Mind and body approaches, 4) Herbalism and 
natural products, 5) Serious conditions, 6) CAM use. The predictors were sex, age, 
Intuitive responses on the CRT (CRTi), self-reported rational thinking, self-reported 
experiential (intuitive) thinking, OtE, WordSum (a measure of verbal intelligence; 
Huang & Hauser, 1998). Statistics pertaining to all regressions are shown in Tables 
3.3 to 3.7 respectively. 
 
For all regressions, the assumptions were tested as follows: 1) Independence of 
errors with the Durbin-Watson test, whereby values distant from 2 (< 1, >3) indicate 
lack of independence (Durbin & Watson, 1951); 2) collinearity with the mean 
variance inflation factor (VIF; Bowerman & O’Connell, 1990), whereby mean values 
greater than 1 indicate multicollinearity; 3) scatter plots of residuals were scrutinised 
for problematic heteroscedasticity, indicated by funnelling of the data; 4) normality 
of the residuals was assessed with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, where significance 
indicates deviation from normality; 5) influential cases were screened using Cook’s 
distances, values greater than 1 might be unduly influencing the regression model. 
Violations of these assumptions are reported below. As CAM use was measured on 
a non-linear scale (never, once, monthly, weekly, daily), this variable underwent a 
log 10 transformation before it was regressed. 
 
Materials 
Belief in Complementary and Alternative Medicine (BCAM). The participants 
completed the full ACAM questionnaire, but all analyses reported here are based 
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on the amended ACAM with items removed following PCA and tests of internal 
consistency, as described in Study 1. 
 
Cognitive reflection test (CRT). The original CRT (Frederick, 2005) is becoming well 
known, in particular to psychology students. Therefore an alternative, less well-
known version of the CRT was used (Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). This version 
contains four questions (see below) which test whether people tend to choose 
either an intuitively appealing but incorrect solution, or override the intuitive 
response in favour of more effortful analysis to derive the correct answer. For 
example, the intuitive answer for question 1 is ‘first place’. If one can override the 
appeal of this response and engage in system 2 analytical thought (see Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013), the correct answer (second place) can be derived. Other incorrect 
responses are possible also, i.e. incorrect answers which are neither the cued 
intuitive response or the correct response. In this study, only the number of intuitive 
responses was counted, therefore giving a score ranging from 0 to 4. 
 
(1) If you’re running a race and you pass the person in second place, 
what place are you in? (intuitive answer: first; correct answer: second) 
 
(2) A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many are left? 
(intuitive answer: 7; correct answer: 8) 
 
(3) Emily’s father has three daughters. The first two are named April 
and May. What is the third daughter’s name? (intuitive answer: June; 
correct answer: Emily) 
 
(4) How many cubic feet of dirt are there in a hole that is 3 feet deep x 
3 feet wide x 3 feet long? (intuitive answer: 27; correct answer: none) 
 
Verbal intelligence. The WordSum is a brief test of vocabulary knowledge which 
correlates highly with other measures of intelligence (Huang & Hauser, 1998). 
Participants are given a list of 10 words. Each word has to be matched with another 
word of the same meaning, from a list of five possibilities (e.g. SEDULOUS: 
muddled, sluggish, stupid, assiduous, corrupting). 
 
Rational-Experiential Inventory. The REI-10 (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj & Heier, 
1996) presents 10 items which ask respondents about the type of thinking style they 
adopt: five items measure faith in intuition (experiential thinking e.g. I believe in 
trusting my hunches), five measure need for cognition (rational thinking, e.g. I prefer 
to do something which challenges my thinking abilities rather than something that 
requires little thought). Responses are measured on a five-point scale from 
completely false to completely true. 
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Openness to experience. The Big Five Inventory is a valid, reliable and quick to use 
measure of the big-five personality traits (Soto & John, 2009). The OtE subscale (10 
items e.g. I see myself as someone who is original, comes up with new ideas; I see 
myself as someone who is curious about many different things), was extracted from 
the questionnaire. Responses are measured on a five-point scale from agree 
strongly to disagree strongly. 
 
Procedure 
The materials were presented to participants on computer in a laboratory, in groups 
of up to 60 at a time. Participants were instructed to complete the materials in 
silence and without discussing their answers with others. The materials were 
presented in a fixed order. 
 
Results 
The means and standard deviations of the key variables are displayed in Table 3.1. 
The median response for CAM use generally was ‘used once’. However, herbal and 
natural products, body manipulation and mind/body approaches were used more 
than energy medicines and AWMS (c2 = 125.03; df = 4, p < .001). 
 
Serious Know AWMS Ener Mind Herb CRTi OtE Exp Rat Word 
1.79 
(0.66) 
2.70 
(0.73) 
2.52 
(1.04) 
2.52 
(1.03) 
2.66 
(0.89) 
3.26 
(0.98) 
1.35 
(1.27) 
3.40 
(0.29) 
3.48 
(0.70) 
3.32 
(0.56) 
4.97 
(2.22) 
Table 3.1. Study 2: Means (with standard deviations in parentheses) of the variables. Note: Serious = 
CAM for serious conditions; Know = knowledge; AWMS = alternative whole medical systems; Ener = 
energy medicines; Mind = mind and body; Herb = herbalism and natural products; CRTi – cognitive 
reflection test intuitive responses; OtE = openness to experience; Exper = experiential thinking; Rat 
= rational thinking; Word = WordSum. 
 
The correlations between the key variables are shown in Table 3.2. As can be seen, 
correlations between the outcome variables (alternative whole medical systems; 
energy medicines; mind and body approaches; herbalism and natural products; 
serious conditions) and the predictors yielded at best modest effect sizes and were 
mostly non-significant. Given the low number of sizeable correlations between 
predictors and outcomes, multiple linear regressions were computed in a backward 
method, in order to remove weak predictors from the model. 
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 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1.Ser .35 ** .43** .38** .22 * .22 * .09 .05 -.31** -.07 -.10 .16 
2.AWMS  .35** .35** .45** .18 .11 .11 -.19 -.10 -.34** .05 
3.Ener   .52** .55** .13 .22* .18 -.28** -.03 -.20 .04 
4.Mind    .42** .07 .02 .07 .003 .03 -.05 .05 
5.Herb     .06 .20* .20* -.20* -.05 -.28 .17 
6.CRTi      .06 -.07 -.21* .04 -.07 -.07 
7.OtE       .23* -.03 -.09 -.07 .17 
8.Exp        .01 -.09 -.08 .22* 
9.Rat         .17 .45** .11 
10.Word          .28** -.18 
11.Age 
12.Use 
          .11 
Table 3.2. Study 2. Correlations between the variables. Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01; Ser = CAM 
for serious conditions; AWMS = alternative whole medical systems; Ener = energy medicines; Mind = 
mind and body; Herb. = herbalism and natural products; CRTi – cognitive reflection test intuitive 
responses; OtE = openness to experience; Exper = experiential thinking; Rat = rational thinking; 
Word = WordSum; Use = CAM use. 
 
Regression analyses 
 
Alternative whole medical systems (AWMS) 
In the first regression (F (1, 92) = 8.14; p = .005; R2 = .081), AWMS was predicted 
negatively only by age (see Table 3.3). Residuals differed from a normal distribution, 
p = .047 and there was evidence of heteroscedasticity), therefore the regression 
was re-run with bootstrapping and this confirmed the negative relation between 
AWMS and Age (B = -.18; 95% CI -.36 and -.04).  
 
Predictor B t Partial 
correlation 
Outcome 
Age -.29 2.85 -.29*  
Alternative 
whole 
medical 
systems 
Sex -.08 -0.81 -.09 
CRTi .18 1.80 .19 
OtE .10 1.00 .10 
Exper. .07 0.69 .07 
Rat. -.06 -0.58 -.06 
Word. -.10 -0.92 -.10 
Table 3.3. Study 2: Statistics pertaining to the regression with alternative whole 
medical systems as the outcome. Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
 
Energy medicines 
In the second regression (F (2, 91) = 6.95; p = .002; R2 = .13), energy medicines had 
a small negative relationship with REI rational and a small positive relation with OtE 
(see Table 3.4).  
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Predictor B t Partial 
correlation 
Outcome 
Age -.11 -0.97 -.10  
Energy 
medicines 
Sex -.06 -0.56 -.06 
CRTi .04 0.36 .04 
OtE .21 2.11 .22* 
Exper. .11 1.14 .12 
Rat. -.29 -2.93 -.29** 
Word. -.01 -0.12 -.01 
Table 3.4. Study 2: Statistics pertaining to the regression with energy medicines 
as the outcome. Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
 
Mind & body 
Mind and body was not predicted significantly by any variables and thus no 
regression was computed. 
 
Herbalism and natural products 
Herbalism and natural products (F (1, 92) = 5.12; p = .026; R2 = .053) was predicted 
weakly and negatively by age (see Table 3.5).  
 
Predictor B t Partial 
correlation 
Outcome 
Age -.22 -2.26 -.22*  
Herbalism 
and natural 
products 
Sex -.17 -1.66 -.17 
CRTi .04 0.35 .04 
OtE .20 1.95 .20 
Exper. .17 1.69 .17 
Rat. -.11 -0.98 -.10 
Word. -.04 -0.35 -.04 
Table 3.5. Study 2: Statistics pertaining to the regression with herbalism and 
natural products as the outcome. Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
 
CAM for serious conditions 
CAM for serious conditions (F (1, 86) = 12.18; p = .001; R2 = .124) had a moderate 
negative association with REI rational thinking (see Table 3.6).  
 
Predictor B t Partial 
correlation 
Outcome 
Age -.002 -0.02 -.002  
CAM for 
serious 
conditions 
Sex -.07 -0.69 -.08 
CRTi .12 1.19 .13 
OtE .10 1.00 .10 
Exper. .07 0.67 .07 
Rat. -.35 -3.49 -.35** 
Word. -.09 -0.92 -.10 
Table 3.6. Study 2: Statistics pertaining to the regression with CAM for serious 
conditions as the outcome. Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
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CAM use 
CAM use (F (2, 78) = 6.59; p = .002; R2 = .145) was associated positively with age 
and negatively with verbal intelligence (see Table 3.7). Assumptions were largely 
met although the residuals were close to a non-normal distribution, p = .053.  
 
Predictor B t Partial 
correlation 
Outcome 
Age .32 2.80 .30** 
CAM use 
Sex .08 0.77 .09 
CRTi .01 0.09 -01 
OtE .11 1.08 .12 
Exper. .17 1.60 .18 
Rat. .02 0.21 .02 
Word. -.37 -3.22 -.34** 
Table 3.7. Study 2: Statistics pertaining to the regression with CAM use as the 
outcome. Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
 
Conclusions 
In summary, OtE had weak but positive relationships with energy medicines and 
herbalism. Although this is consistent with one previous study (Ho, 2012), others 
have mostly failed to find such a relationship (Hogan, 2006; Won, 2014). Instead, 
previous literature suggests OtE is more reliably related to CAM use (Lombart, 
2002; Smith et al., 2008; Sirois & Gick, 2002). However, in the current study, this 
relationship was not evident at all. 
 
Rational thinking style had weak to modest negative relationships with energy 
medicines and CAM for serious conditions. This conflicts somewhat with previous 
findings, in which stronger CAM beliefs are found in intuitive thinkers (Lindeman, 
2011; Saher & Lindeman, 2005; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013). In the current study, 
weaker CAM beliefs were found in rational thinkers. Contrary to expectations, the 
performance measure of intuitive thinking – the CRT – was not significantly related 
to CAM beliefs either: the CRT did have a weak positive relationship with CAM for 
serious conditions, but rationality explained more of the variance in this particular 
belief. This suggests that CAM belief is related not to actual thinking performance 
but more to one’s perceived thinking style, and as shown in Table 3.2 the CRT is, at 
best, only weakly correlated with self-reported thinking style.  
 
Sex, verbal intelligence, experiential thinking and intuitive responding on the CRT 
failed to register significant relationships with any types of CAM belief. CAM use 
was more frequent in older participants, less frequent in those with higher verbal 
intelligence (WordSum scores). 
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Study 3 will set out to test these relationships further, but with a different sample 
and with modifications to some of the materials: in particular, alternative and 
additional measures of OtE and of intuitive thinking. 
 
Study 3. Performance measures of reasoning, CAM beliefs and CAM 
use: a replication 
Openness to experience was one of the variables that had been identified most 
strongly with CAM use and CAM beliefs in the systematic review by the author and 
colleagues, reported in the Preliminary Chapter. In study 2 however, OtE had, at 
best, weak relationships with CAM beliefs and was not related to CAM use. In order 
to further test the relation between OtE and CAM beliefs/use, study 3 would 
employ an alternative measure of OtE to explore whether the weak relationships 
were due simply to the choice of OtE questionnaire. The new measure would be the 
mini-IPIP deriving two separate dimensions of OtE: imagination and intellect 
(Donnellan, Oswald, Baird & Lucas, 2006). 
 
Another predictor which failed to yield relationships with CAM beliefs in study 2 was 
the CRT. A different version of the CRT was employed in study 3, to eliminate the 
possibility that the failure to observe relationships in study 2 was due to using a 
particular version of the CRT. Here, in study 3, the original CRT (Frederick, 2005; 
Toplak et al., 2011) would be employed. 
 
Furthermore, an additional performance measure of intuitive/rational thinking was 
introduced. Base rate problems offer an alternative means of testing people’s ability 
to override automatic, intuitive responses in favour of analytical, system 2 thinking 
(Bar-Hillel, 1980). They present the respondent with a conflict between an intuitively 
appealing stereotype and probabilistic information. As with the CRT, choosing the 
probabilistic information represents an override of intuitive thought in favour of 
analytical thought (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). Thus five base rate problems would 
be added as a further means - additional to the CRT - for testing the relation 
between CAM beliefs and thinking performance. Although the CRT has 
demonstrated very strong validity in the reasoning literature, it was felt that adding 
a different performance measure of thinking would give more robustness to the 
methodology. This would allow the researcher to measure whether relationships 
between CAM beliefs and thinking performance were task specific. 
 
Aims and predictions 
The aims were to further test the relationships explored in study 2. The following 
relationships are predicted: 
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A positive relationship between CAM belief/CAM use and: intuitive responding on 
the CRT; intuitive responding on Base rate problems; OtE imagination; OtE 
intellect; experiential (intuitive) thinking on the REI; 
 
A negative relationship between CAM belief/CAM use and rational thinking on the 
REI. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
All participants (N = 87; 65 females) were 18 or over with a mean age of 36 years 
(SD = 19 years, 6 months), and able to read and speak in English. The respondents 
were either members of the general public or undergraduate students in a range of 
subjects.  
 
Design and statistical analyses 
Given the low number of sizeable correlations between predictors and outcomes 
(See Table 3.8), multiple linear regressions were computed in a backward method, 
in order to remove weak predictors from the model. 
 
As with study 2, the outcome variables in each of the six regressions were 
respectively: 1) alternative whole medical systems, 2) Energy medicines, 3) Mind 
and body approaches, 4) Herbalism and natural products, 5) CAM for serious 
conditions, 6) CAM use. The predictors were CRTi, base rate, OtE imagination, OtE 
intellect, experiential thinking, rational thinking, WordSum score (verbal 
intelligence). Age and sex. Statistics pertaining to all regressions are shown in 
Tables 3.10 to 3.13 respectively. 
 
Violations of the assumptions for linear regression were checked, but none were 
found. 
 
Materials 
The materials were the same as in study 2 but for the following.  
 
Base rate neglect. A set of base rate measures was included as an additional 
performance measure of reasoning. These problems tested whether people either 
make use of base rate information or rely on stereotypes to make a judgement (De 
Neys & Glumicic, 2008). For example: 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there 
were 995 nurses and 5 doctors. Jake is a randomly chosen participant 
of this study. Jake is 34 years old. He lives in a beautiful home in a 
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posh suburb. He is well spoken and very interested in politics. He 
invests a lot of time in his career.  
What is most likely? 
a. Jake is a nurse. 
b. Jake is a doctor. 
 
These problems present a conflict between the base rate data, which suggests a 
high statistical likelihood that Jake is a nurse and an intuitive response which is 
triggered by the similarity between the stereotyped description and the possibility 
that Jake is a doctor. As with the CRT, base rate problems test whether individuals 
are willing or able to resist the intuitive answer and to engage with system 2, 
analytical thought (Stanovich & West, 2000). Unlike the CRT, there is no objectively 
correct answer, but in this study, scores were derived by summing the number of 
intuitive responses – i.e. responses which neglect base-rate. 
 
Cognitive reflection test. The original version of the CRT was administered here 
(Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2011). Three arithmetic problems test whether 
people tend to choose either an intuitively sensible but incorrect solution, or 
override the intuitive response in favour of more effortful analysis. For example: 
 
A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs a pound more than 
the ball. How much does the ball cost? ____ pence (intuitive answer: 
10p; correct answer: 5p.) 
 
Openness to experience. The mini IPIP is a valid, reliable and quick to use measure 
of the big-five personality traits (Donnellan et al., 2006). The OtE subscale is 
labelled Imagination/Intellect and has only 4 items (e.g. I have a vivid imagination). 
Responses are measured on a five-point scale from very inaccurate to very accurate. 
The OtE subscale was tested for internal consistency and produced an 
unsatisfactory Cronbach’s alpha (.56). Inter-item correlations revealed that the two 
Imagination items correlated moderately with each other (r = .41) and the two 
intellect items correlated moderately too (r = .48). Imagination items did not 
correlate with intellect items (r £  .19). For this reason, it was decided that two 
separate OtE scores would be calculated: imagination and intellect. 
 
Aside from these changes, the materials were identical to those used in study 2.
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 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.Ser .47** .40** .58** .28* .22* .28* -.29* -.11 .32** -.15 -.15 .15 .26* 
2.AWMS  .49** .41** .40** .13 .11 .02 -.14 .23* .00 -.14 -.08 .24* 
3.Ener   .36** .54** -.07 .05 -.07 .04 .18 -.18 -.02 -.15 .34** 
4.Mind    .39** .04 .09 -.24* -.04 .17 .04 -.05 .09 .32** 
5.Herb     -.07 .09 .01 .01 .13 -.06 -.02 -.04 .33** 
6.CRTi      .10 -.12 -.08 .08 -.04 -.15 .18 -.13 
7. Basei       -.04 -.09 .13 -.10 .18 .18 -.24* 
8.OtE Im        .19 -.09 .32** -.03 -.03 .11 
9.OtE Int         -.13 .24* .08 -.13 .02 
10.Exp          -.16 -.06 .29* .19 
11.Rat           -.06 -.05 .07 
12.Word            .26* .19 
13.Age             .12 
14.Use              
Table 3.8. Study 3: Correlations between the variables. Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01; Ser = CAM for 
serious conditions; AWMS = alternative whole medical systems; Ener = energy medicines; Mind = mind and 
body; Herb. = herbalism and natural products; CRTi – cognitive reflection test intuitive responses; Basei = 
base rate neglect; OtE Im = openness to experience, imagination; OtE Int = openness to experience, 
intellect; Exper = experiential thinking; Rat = rational thinking; Word = WordSum score; Use = CAM use. 
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Results 
The means and standard deviations for key variables are shown in Table 3.9. The 
median response for general CAM use was ‘never’. However, herbal and natural 
products, and mind/body approaches (both with a median = ‘used once’) were used 
more often than the others (c2 = 55.47; df = 4, p < .001). 
 
 
Ser Kno AW Ener Min Her CRTi Basei OtE Im. 
OtE  
Int. 
Exp Rat Wor 
x ̅ 2.08 2.82 2.9 3.01 2.98 3.24 1.37 3.02 3.98 3.42 3.61 3.55 5.79 
SD 0.79 -0.79 -0.92 -0.97 -0.95 -0.97 -1.06 1.43 -0.90 -0.87 -0.79 -0.76 -1.8 
Table 3.9. Study 3: Means and standard deviations for the variables. Note: Ser = CAM for serious 
conditions; Kno = knowledge; AW = alternative whole medical systems; Ener = energy medicines; Min 
= mind and body; Her = herbalism and natural products; CRTi – cognitive reflection test intuitive 
responses; Basei = base rate intuitive responses; OtE Im = openness to experience, imagination; OtE 
Int = openness to experience, intellect; Exp = experiential thinking; Rat = rational thinking; Wor = 
WordSum score. 
  
Regression analyses 
 
Alternative whole medical systems 
In the first regression, no significant relationships emerged; the strongest relationship 
with AWMS was that of experiential thinking (partial r =-.21; p = .073).  
 
Energy medicines 
In the second regression (F (2, 73) = 2.98; p = .057; R2 = .075), experiential thinking 
had a weak, positive relationship (see Table 3.10) and age had a weak, negative 
relationship with energy medicines.  
 
Predictor B t Partial 
correlation 
Outcome 
CRTi -.04 -0.32 -.04  
 
 
Energy 
medicines 
Basei .03 0.29 .04 
OtE Im. -.09 -0.79 -.10 
OtE Int. .03 .022 .03 
Exper. .24 2.05 .23* 
Rat. -.17 -1.51 -.18 
Word. .03 0.23 .03 
Age -.23 -1.91 .22 
Sex -.06 -0.53 -.06 
Table 3.10. Study 3: Statistics pertaining to the regression with energy medicines 
as the outcome. Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
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Mind & body 
With mind and body as the outcome, there was a significant regression (F (1, 71) = 
6.88; p = .011; R2 = .088). OtE imagination was the only significant predictor, with a 
moderate negative relationship (see Table 3.11).  
 
Predictor B t Partial 
correlation 
Outcome 
CRTi -.003 -0.03 -.003  
 
 
Mind and 
body 
Basei .02 0.13 .02 
OtE Im. -.30 -2.62 -.30* 
OtE Int. .00 -0.002 .00 
Exper. .14 1.19 .14 
Rat. .13 1.13 .13 
Word. -.10 -0.87 -.10 
Age .06 0.51 .06 
Sex .03 0.25 .03 
Table 3.11. Study 3: Statistics pertaining to the regression with mind and body as 
the outcome. Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
 
Herbalism and natural products 
Herbalism and natural products yielded no sizeable (£ .13) or significant simple 
correlations with any predictor variable (see Table 3.8). Therefore a regression was 
not conducted for this outcome. 
 
CAM for serious conditions 
With CAM for serious conditions as the outcome, a significant regression emerged (F 
(4, 71) = 6.32; p < .001; R2 = .263) with four significant predictors. Two positively 
related: experiential thinking (see Table 3.12) and base rate intuitive; and two 
negatively related: OtE imagination and WordSum.  
 
Predictor B t Partial 
correlation 
Outcome 
CRTi .10 0.99 .12  
 
 
CAM for 
serious 
conditions 
Basei .22 2.09 .24* 
OtE Im. -.30 -2.90 -.33* 
OtE Int. -.04 -0.35 -.04 
Exper. .23 2.23 .26* 
Rat. -.02 -0.14 -.02 
Word. -.24 -2.25 -.26* 
Age .07 0.57 .07 
Sex .12 1.09 .13 
Table 3.12. Study 3: Statistics pertaining to the regression with CAM for serious 
conditions as the outcome. 
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CAM use 
With CAM use as the criterion, the regression was significant (F (1, 60) = 4.39; p = 
.040; R2 = .068). Intuitive responding on the base rate problems was the only 
significant predictor with a weak positive relationship (see Table 3.13).  
 
Predictor B t Partial 
correlation 
Outcome 
CRTi -.08i .54 -.08  
 
 
CAM use 
Basei .26 2.09 .26* 
OtE Im. .07i .58 .07 
OtE Int. -.003i .98 -.003 
Exper. .19i .13 .20 
Rat. .02i .88 .02 
Word. .09i .48 .09 
Age .07i .59 .07 
Sex -.16i .21 -.16 
Table 3.13. Study 3: Statistics pertaining to the regression with CAM use as the 
outcome. 
 
In summary, there were weak to moderate relationships between CAM 
beliefs/knowledge and various predictors, however only experiential thinking and 
OtE imagination emerged as significant more than once. Of all the measures of CAM, 
it was CAM for serious conditions which was explained most comprehensively by the 
predictors. Base rate neglect emerged twice: as a weak predictor of CAM for serious 
conditions and CAM use. 
 
Conclusions 
These findings are somewhat consistent with those of study 2. Firstly, self-reported 
experiential thinking style predicted CAM beliefs in relation to energy medicines and 
also CAM for serious conditions. This supports previous studies which had reported 
relationships between CAM beliefs and intuitive thinking as measured on the REI self-
report questionnaire (Lindeman, 2011; Saher & Lindeman, 2005; Svedholm & 
Lindeman, 2013). Only one of the performance measures of intuitive thinking - base 
rate problems - predicted CAM beliefs: beliefs about serious conditions, although 
base rate problems did also predict CAM use.  
 
OtE did predict belief in two types of CAM. Unlike previous studies which report 
associations between CAM use/CAM beliefs and OtE (Smith et al., 2008; Ho, 2012) 
the direction of the relationship was negative. This can perhaps be explained by the 
use of the mini IPIP: its OtE imagination score was related to CAM beliefs, the OtE 
intellect variable was not. The OtE imagination score correlates with rational not 
intuitive thinking on the REI (see Table 3.8), which is consistent with wider literature 
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Therefore, it is possible that this component of OtE reflects 
the tendency to analyse and think of alternatives - a trait negatively associated with 
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CAM beliefs. This also illustrates that OtE itself is multidimensional and the 
relationship between OtE and CAM beliefs might vary depending on the measure 
used.  
 
Discussion 
Although the findings from studies 2 and 3 do not replicate perfectly, there is 
congruence between them. Firstly, in both studies, the most common relationships 
with CAM beliefs were those from the REI. Secondly, although CAM beliefs were 
sometimes associated with people’s perceptions of their own thinking (i.e. the REI), 
they were generally not associated with actual thinking performance.  
 
CAM beliefs and self-reported thinking style 
Turning to the first of these key findings; in study 3, CAM believers were more likely 
to be intuitive thinkers, consistent with previous research (Lindeman, 2011; Saher & 
Lindeman, 2005; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013. In study 2, a new finding was 
observed: CAM believers were less likely to be rational thinkers.  
 
The reason for this new finding could be due to sampling. Like study 3, Lindeman 
and colleagues’ found that CAM believers were also intuitive thinkers. In all these 
studies, samples comprised members of the general public and undergraduates from 
a range of disciplines. In study 2 the sample was made-up purely of psychology 
undergraduates and here it was rational not intuitive thinking which related to CAM 
beliefs. It could be that the emphasis on critical and scientific thinking in 
undergraduate psychology training contributed to this relationship. In essence, due 
to their training, psychology students who see themselves as rational thinkers, might 
associate this with not believing in CAM, more so than undergraduates generally or 
the general public. 
 
Performance measures of thinking style 
The second main finding from studies 2 and 3 is related to the first. Self-reported 
thinking style was related to CAM beliefs, but actual reasoning performance 
generally, was not. Our findings suggest that it is not thinking style per se which 
predicts CAM beliefs, but rather a person’s view of what their thinking style is. This 
suggests that the conclusions drawn by Lindeman and colleagues (Lindeman, 2011; 
Saher & Lindeman, 2005; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013) about the relation between 
CAM beliefs and thinking might need to be reviewed. An alternative interpretation is 
that people who see themselves as intuitive thinkers, who value trusting their 
hunches, are more likely to believe in CAM. Conversely people who like to see 
themselves as rational might be more likely to reject CAM. However, these self-views 
of one’s thinking style do not necessarily reflect their actual thinking style, which itself 
is a poor predictor of CAM belief.  
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Thus, despite evidence that cognitive/reasoning biases play a role in various kinds of 
beliefs (e.g. delusions, Galbraith & Manktelow, 2014; phobias, de Jong, 2014; 
paranormal belief, Rogers, 2014) studies 2 and 3, together suggest that cognitive 
bias is less of a factor in CAM beliefs than one’s perception of one’s thinking (even 
though that perception itself might not be accurate). This view is in line with previous 
literature showing that CAM beliefs are reliably predicted by other beliefs – if one 
believes in CAM, then one is likely to believe in certain other concepts too, such as 
holistic health (Astin, 1998), suspicion of modern medicine and science (Furnham, 
2007; Hsiao et al., 2003), new age philosophies (Bishop, Yardley and Lewith, 2007) 
and belief in the paranormal (Jeswani & Furnham, 2010; Van den Bulck & Custers, 
2009). In this sense, beliefs about one’s own thinking style could be added to the list 
of beliefs associated with CAM. A direction for future research could be to explore 
whether CAM believers’ beliefs about their own thinking style correspond with their 
ideas about what constitutes ‘good thinking’ (see Baron, 1995). 
 
Other variables 
In study 2, age was negatively related with belief in two different forms of CAM. This 
finding was generally not replicated in study 3. This finding supports previous 
research that CAM use is more common in those who are younger (see Verhoef et 
al.’s (2005) review of CAM use in cancer patients). Sex was not a significant predictor 
of CAM belief, in contrast to previous research (e.g. Frass et al., 2012; Verhoef et al., 
2005). Verbal intelligence, as measured by the WordSum was generally not related to 
CAM beliefs but was related negatively to CAM use in study 2. 
 
Openness to experience was related to some CAM beliefs, but the relationships were 
weak and the direction of the relationships changed as a function of the measure 
used. Overall, the evidence for a relationship between CAM beliefs and OtE is 
unconvincing. These studies also failed to support previous findings that CAM use is 
related to OtE (Lombart, 2002; Smith et al., 2008; Sirois & Gick, 2002). Future studies 
might consider testing a broader range of OtE sub-factors, such as openness to 
fantasy (Stephan, 2009) as there is evidence that this facet of OtE is related to belief 
in the paranormal (Smith, Johnson & Hathaway, 2009) – which itself has been shown 
to be a correlate of CAM belief (e.g. Jeswani & Furnham, 2010). 
 
There was no obvious indication that some categories of CAM belief were better 
predicted than others, although REI scores correlated with energy medicines and 
CAM for serious conditions in both study 2 and 3. All types of CAM belief were 
associated with some predictors. What studies 2 and 3 do indicate is that 
relationships between psychological variables and CAM beliefs are nuanced and 
might be obscured if CAM belief is homogenised. Where relationships emerged they 
were consistently of a .2 to .3 magnitude, showing that the predictors only explain a 
small degree of variance in CAM belief. This opens up the question of what variables 
might explain the remaining variance. This could be accounted for by previous 
	 58	
experience of exposure to CAM, by other belief systems (see Bishop et al. (2007), but 
this poses intriguing questions for future research. 
 
One of the difficulties posed by testing multiple forms of CAM is the increase in 
family-wise error and therefore the increased chances of type 1 error. This was 
necessitated by the exploratory nature of studies 2 and 3, however future research 
might reduce potential error by choosing dependent variables according to a priori 
hypotheses and by testing multiple forms of CAM only when theoretically justified. 
 
Future research 
Relationships between CAM beliefs and performance measures of reasoning were 
mostly non-significant and weak, despite employing three tests (two versions of the 
CRT and a set of base rate problems). These tasks were chosen because they tested 
intuitive versus analytical responding. However, this is by no means an exhaustive set 
of the possible tests of reasoning that could be employed. Stanovich, West and 
Toplak (2016) have published a taxonomy of tasks for testing various types of 
rationality, partly based on the heuristics and biases literature (Kahneman, 2011; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1975). These encompass tests of various cognitive biases, 
linked to processing limitations (like the CRT) but also tests of knowledge and belief. 
A comprehensive exploration of the different forms of rationality potentially 
associated with CAM belief is an option for future studies. 
 
Future studies might also consider the issue of demand characteristics. It is possible 
that the aims of the study are transparent to the participants – ‘are CAM believers 
less analytical?’ This might bias their responding on the measures. There are a 
number of possible solutions. Firstly, the instructions might be tailored so as to be 
less explicit about the aims of the study. For example, the instructions might speak 
about approaches to healthcare rather than CAM specifically. Secondly, the 
administration of the measures might be split across time, for example, with the 
ACAM being completed a week or two prior to/after the thinking measures, so that 
the aims of the research are less obvious. 
 
Conclusions 
Studies 2 and 3 demonstrate that self-reported thinking style can have a subtle 
relationship with CAM belief. The observation of such relationships depends on the 
type of CAM in question and possibly the characteristics of the sample. Additionally, 
people’s self-reported thinking style and their actual thinking style correlate poorly, 
and the former (self-reported thinking style), predicts belief in CAM somewhat more 
consistently. In exploring both thinking style and OtE, studies 2 and 3 have 
empirically tested two of the three psychological factors in CAM use/belief identified 
in the author’s systematic review (Preliminary Chapter), and in doing so have added 
new knowledge to the psychological literature. The third psychological factor 
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identified by the systematic review has not yet been explored within the thesis: 
namely that of ontological confusions. 
 
Ontological confusions are where one blurs the distinctions between the basic 
categories which define our reality, in particular the distinctions between physical, 
biological and mental phenomena (see Lindeman, 2011; Lindeman & Saher, 2007; 
Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013). Lindeman (2011) argues that such confusions can 
underpin CAM beliefs. Given that ontological confusions represent an important 
cognitive factor in CAM belief, this cognitive bias is of potential interest to health 
psychology. Therefore, the final empirical chapter will explore how ontological 
mistakes interact with another important theme in this thesis: thinking.  
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Chapter 4. Ontological mistakes and reasoning 
 
Introduction 
Ontology is a branch of philosophy concerned with the categories and rules which 
define our reality. Thus ontology provides a classification of things (Smith, 2003). 
Core ontological categories provide the foundation for our understanding of the 
world and here Lindeman (2011) draws the distinction between physical, biological 
and mental categories. Physical objects are contrasted with mental phenomena in 
that the former have an independent existence and they can move if touched by 
another moving object. Mental phenomena are the product of sentient beings with 
intentionality. Core biological knowledge includes notions of contamination and 
healing and the distinctions between artificial and living (Lindeman, 2011).  
 
Lindeman (2011) argues that, in many types of CAM, the underlying principles or 
philosophies incorporate clear ontological mistakes. For example, that processes 
such as energy can be good or bad, that non-sentient physical phenomena can have 
mental properties (e.g. water with memory), confusing processes with objects (Saher 
& Lindeman, 2007; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013).  Lindeman (2011) argues that an 
awareness of these mistakes provides a cue to the individual that some of the 
underlying premises of the therapy lack credibility. If such ontological mistakes go 
unnoticed, an important weakness in the theoretical basis of the therapy is 
overlooked. Thus the ability to spot ontological mistakes might be associated with 
believing in CAM. Lindeman and colleagues provide support for this idea: believers 
in CAM are more likely to make ontological mistakes (Lindeman, 2011; Lindeman & 
Saher, 2007; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013). Indeed, Lindeman (2011) shows that the 
tendency to make ontological mistakes is related to both beliefs in CAM and self-
reported intuitive thinking. Furthermore, the tendency to make ontological mistakes 
is also related to performance measures of intuitive thinking, as measured on the CRT 
and base rate tasks (Pennycook et al., 2015). There is evidence then that a tendency 
to make ontological mistakes is a potentially important bias in health beliefs. 
Therefore, this represents a psychological factor of potential interest to health 
psychology. 
 
Although humans begin to understand core ontological distinctions in infancy 
(Backscheider, Shatz, & Gelman, 1993), children are more prone to ontological 
mistakes than adults (Keleman, 1999a, 1999b). For example, adults are less likely than 
children to offer teleological accounts – that things exist for a purpose (e.g. the 
function of a mountain: ‘to climb’; the function of a lion: ‘to look at’; Keleman, 1999a), 
suggesting that people acquire more sophisticated ontological understanding as they 
age. However, adults make more ontological mistakes when put under time-pressure. 
Keleman and Rosset (2009) found that when under no time restrictions, adults 
successfully identified teleological statements, but when under time-limited 
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conditions they were more likely to endorse such statements. Keleman and Rosset 
(2009) therefore argue that adults retain teleological explanations which, with age, 
are suppressed rather than replaced by more scientific explanations.  
 
Furthermore, Keleman and Rosset (2009) found that adults with poorer inhibitory 
control were more prone to endorsing teleological statements. Thus teleological 
mistakes are more likely when one succumbs to intuition, but can be suppressed if 
processing time is available. This is consistent with dual-processing accounts of 
cognition, whereby thinkers rely on fast and effortless system 1 processing unless 
cued to engage in slow and cognitively expensive system 2 processing (e.g. Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). Experiments by Valerie Thompson and colleagues show that rapid 
responding on reasoning tasks is associated with an intuitive ‘feeling of rightness’ 
(FOR), whereas low FOR is associated with longer thinking time and an increased 
likelihood of changing one’s initial answer (Thompson, Prowse Turner & Pennycook, 
2011). As analytical, system 2 cognition is comparatively slow, when processing time 
is inhibited participants are more likely to fall-back on intuitive, system 1 thinking (See 
Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). 
 
If people need unfettered access to cognitive resources to efficiently spot ontological 
mistakes, then other ways of limiting cognitive processing, besides limiting time, 
might have the same effect. One possibility here is reasoning itself: if people are busy 
using their cognitive resources to reason logically, would this effort expend the 
cognitive resources needed to simultaneously notice ontological mistakes? The belief 
bias paradigm offers a means of exploring this. Belief bias is where believability 
interferes with logical analysis: reasoners instructed to conclude on the basis of logic 
only, nevertheless tend to favour believable over unbelievable conclusions (Evans, 
Barston & Pollard, 1983; Morley, Evans & Handley, 2004). Belief is said to be a system 
1 process, therefore comparatively fast and effortless, hence the ease with which 
believability can bias logical reasoning. If spotting ontological mistakes requires 
cognitive effort, then ontological incorrectness should not bias logical reasoning in 
the way that mere believability does – because the cognitive effort it requires is 
already allocated to the task of logical analysis.  
 
The failure to notice ontological mistakes is potentially one reason why people put 
faith in scientifically questionable forms of complementary medicine. Two 
experiments will test the ease of detecting ontological mistakes when simultaneous 
cognitive processing demands are either high or low. There is ecological validity in 
exploring ontological mistakes in this way. In everyday contexts, when people are 
presented with arguments about a form of CAM, such information will likely be 
assessed according to belief and argument strength, and inferences will be drawn 
from the information presented (Green, 2008; Hoeken, Timmers & Schellens, 2012; 
Lin, Horng & Anderson, 2014; Shaw, 1996; Thompson, Evans & Handley, 2005; von 
der Mühlen, Richter, Schmid, Schmidt & Berthold, 2016). So, although the theory 
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behind many forms of CAM might contain ontological mistakes, in the real world, 
such mistakes will rarely be laid bare, the ability to detect will likely be hindered by 
competing processing demands such as reasoning.  
 
Study 4. Syllogisms with instructions on validity only 
Some argue that belief (system 1) and analytical (system 2) processes are engaged 
simultaneously in reasoning tasks (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Sloman, 2002; Stupple 
& Ball, 2008). In some cases though, these two processes will conflict: a conclusion to 
a reasoning problem will be unbelievable but valid, or believable yet invalid. When 
this conflict between belief and logic is detected, cognitive resources will be 
engaged to resolve the conflict. When belief and logic are in agreement, processing 
will be less intensive because no resolution is required. Stupple and Ball (2008) 
supported this view by showing that people inspect premises and conclusions for 
longer on problems where belief and logic conflict than when they do not conflict.  
 
So, system 1 processes such as belief can operate simultaneously with system 2 
processes. However, as resolution of belief-logic conflict is computationally 
expensive, in this situation people often fall-back onto heuristics such as belief: 
indeed belief bias is more pronounced on conflict than on non-conflict problems 
(Stupple & Ball, 2008). If detecting ontological mistakes is a system 2 process, then 
ontological correctness should not bias conflict syllogisms, because the spare 
cognitive capacity required for detecting ontological mistakes should be unavailable, 
instead being devoted to resolving the conflict between logic and belief. In contrast, 
one would expect ontological correctness to have more of an effect where belief and 
logic are in harmony and where more cognitive capacity is available for the 
ontological mistake to be noticed.  
 
Study 4 will test this theory. Participants will be presented with syllogisms in which 
ontology and belief/validity conflict will be manipulated. Participants here will not be 
instructed on the presence of, nor how to detect, ontological mistakes. Participants 
will be told that their task is to evaluate the conclusions on the basis of logical validity 
only. 
 
It is expected that ontology and conflict will interact, such that ontologically correct 
conclusions will be endorsed more than ontologically incorrect on non-conflict 
syllogisms but not on conflict syllogisms. 
 
There was a second aim to study 4. If belief in CAM is related to ontological 
confusions (Lindeman 2011; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013) then the ability to be 
biased by ontological correctness even when cognitive resources are depleted 
should reduce belief in CAM. This is because if one can still notice mistakes when 
cognitive resources are in high demand, then perhaps ontological flaws in CAM 
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claims will be more evident. Thus the second aim here was to test whether the ability 
to be biased by ontological mistakes was related to beliefs in the effectiveness of 
CAM. 
 
A single score, reflecting the interaction between ontological correctness and conflict 
was to be created. This score represents the ratio of choosing ontologically correct 
over incorrect conclusions when it is cognitively hard (i.e. on conflict problems) 
compared to when it is easy (i.e. on non-conflict problems). Thus this single score 
represents individual differences in the predicted two-way interaction from study 4. It 
was predicted that higher scores on this measure would mean lower beliefs in CAM. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Seventy-nine undergraduates in psychology participated in the study (35 females, 36 
males, 8 missing). The mean age was 28 years and 7 months (SD = 10 years). 
 
Design 
A 2x2 fully within groups design incorporated ontology (correct, incorrect) and 
conflict (conflict, non-conflict) as the two factors. Judgements of conclusions as either 
valid or invalid was the dependent variable. 
 
Materials 
Sixteen categorical syllogisms were presented to participants. Syllogisms consist of 
two statements or premises followed by a conclusion. An evaluation paradigm was 
chosen (i.e. where the conclusion is presented for the participant to evaluate) rather 
than a construction paradigm (in which participant construct conclusions themselves). 
A syllogism contains three terms, A, B and C. The first premise links A and B, the 
second premise links B and C and the conclusion links A and C. The premises and 
conclusion can have any one of four quantifiers, these are also known as a ‘mood’ 
and each is labelled with a letter: 
 
A All _ are _ 
E No _ are _ 
I Some _ are _ 
O Some _ are not _ 
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There are four ways in which the premises can be arranged, these are referred to as 
the ‘figure’ of the syllogism: 
 
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 
AB 
BC 
BA 
CB 
AB 
CB 
BA 
BC 
 
The conclusion can take an A-C or a C-A form. By these rules there are 512 possible 
syllogisms, most of which are logically invalid (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984). In order 
to incorporate ontologically correct and incorrect statements, two syllogistic forms 
were adopted, the first representing figure 2 (BA-CB), with a C-A conclusion which is 
valid: 
 
All B are A 
C are B 
Therefore C are A 
 
And the second representing figure 3 (AB-CB), with a C-A conclusion which is invalid 
 
All A are B 
C are B 
Therefore C are A 
 
The AAA mood of the syllogisms allowed for easy manipulation of ontology, 
believability and validity and controlled for the ‘atmosphere’ effect, whereby certain 
premise moods bias preferences for conclusion type (Begg & Denny, 1969). The two 
syllogistic forms do differ in terms of the figural effect: the BA-CB syllogism is known 
to bias people toward a C-A (rather than an A-C) conclusion, whereas the AB-CB 
problem does not favour either conclusion type. However, the figural effect is not 
noticeable on evaluation syllogisms in belief bias experiments (Morley et al., 2004) 
and although the effect might influence processing time, it has little effect on 
conclusion acceptance rates in the evaluation paradigm (Stupple and Ball, 2007).  
 
The 16 conclusions contained a physical or biological phenomenon with a particular 
quality (e.g. rivers are dangerous). Ontologically incorrect conclusions indicated 
intentionality (e.g. apple orchards are generous). As all the biological/physical 
phenomena in the conclusions were non-sentient, none could possess intentionality, 
so attributing intentionality to these categories represented an ontological mistake. 
Ontologically correct conclusions paired a phenomenon with a permissible quality 
(e.g. clouds are light). Half of the ontologically incorrect conclusions were also 
believable, such that the qualities attributed, although incorrect, were plausible as 
metaphors (e.g. trees are wise). Ontologically incorrect and unbelievable conclusions 
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attributed qualities which were both incorrect and implausible, even as a metaphor 
(e.g. sunshine is selfish).  
 
 Ontologically Incorrect Ontologically Correct 
Believable Apple orchards are generous 
Viruses are vindictive 
The moon is composed 
Trees are wise 
x ̄ = 11.00 (SD = 2.45) 
Rivers are dangerous 
Televisions are human-made 
Clouds are light 
Deserts are dry 
x ̄ = 17.00 (SD = 2.97) 
Unbelievable Mountains are miserly 
Sunshine is selfish 
Soil erosion is conscientious 
Asteroids are thoughtful 
x ̄ = 9.00 (4.20) 
Diseases are pleasurable 
Atoms are visible 
Farms are underwater 
Bones are stretchy 
x ̄ = 8.14 (SD = 3.24) 
Table 4.1. Study 4: Conclusions as a function of believability and ontology, with mean believability 
ratings (standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
The full set of conclusions are shown in Table 4.1 (see also Appendix A). The 
believability manipulation was tested by asking a group of psychology students to 
rate how believable the conclusions were on a five-point scale ranging from very 
believable to very unbelievable. Table 4.1 shows that believable conclusions were 
rated as more believable than unbelievable conclusions. 
 
Thus ontological correctness, validity and believability of the conclusions were 
manipulated. Believability and validity were collapsed into one factor to create 
conclusions where belief and logic conflicted (i.e. believable-invalid, unbelievable-
valid) or did not conflict (i.e. believable-valid, unbelievable-invalid. Table 4.2 
illustrates this. 
 
Factor 1 Ontologically correct Ontologically incorrect 
Factor 2 Conflict Non-conflict Conflict Non-conflict 
Conclusion 
type 
Believable-
invalid 
Believable-
valid 
Believable-
invalid 
Believable-
valid 
Unbelievable-
valid 
Unbelievable-
invalid 
Unbelievable-
valid 
Unbelievable-
invalid 
Table 4.2. Study 4: the experimental design. 
 
Participants were given no instructions about the believability of the conclusions or 
about ontological correctness. They were told that: 
 
…you are going to receive a series of thinking problems. Each one contains 
two statements followed by a conclusion. You must decide whether the 
conclusion follows logically or not from the statements before it.  
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So, you must decide if the given conclusion follows logically from the 
statements. Choose VALID if, and only if, you judge that the conclusion can he 
derived unequivocally from the two statements before it, otherwise choose 
INVALID. 
 
Four filler syllogisms were included with the form: 
 
All A are B 
C are not B 
Conclusion: Therefore C are not A 
 
And participants were given three practice problems before beginning (see also 
Appendix A). 
 
Participants in study 4 were also asked to complete Lindeman’s (2011) belief in CAM 
treatments scale. The questionnaire lists 12 forms of CAM and respondents rate how 
effective they believe each one is on a scale from 0-5 (0 = cannot say, 1 = do not 
believe at all, 5 = believe fully). This measure was chosen, rather than the ACAM 
because firstly it is briefer and secondly, this is the measure which has been 
previously used to test relationships between CAM beliefs and ontological confusions 
(Lindeman, 2011; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013). 
 
Results 
A 2x2, fully repeated measures ANOVA was computed. The means and standard 
deviations are shown in Table 4.3. Ontology (correct, incorrect), and conflict (conflict, 
non-conflict) were the factors. The number of conclusions endorsed as valid was the 
dependent variable.  
 
 Ontology Conflict 
 Correct Incorrect Conflict Non-conflict 
Mean 3.19 2.66 2.65 3.18 
SD 1.47 2.05 1.85 1.63 
Table 4.3. Study 4: Descriptives pertaining to the ontology and conflict main 
effects. 
 
There was a significant main effect of ontology (F(1, 77) = 9.10; p = .003; ph2 = 0.11), 
with ontologically correct endorsed as valid more than incorrect (see Table 4.3). 
There was a significant main effect of conflict (F(1, 77) = 10.57; p = .002; ph2 = 0.12), 
with non-conflict conclusions endorsed more than conflict. There was also a 
significant two-way interaction (F(1, 77) = 7.26; p = .009; ph2 = 0.09): as shown in 
Figure 4.1, on conflict problems, ontology had no effect on endorsement rates, but 
on non-conflict problems ontologically correct conclusions were endorsed more than 
incorrect. Simple effects analyses showed that although there was no effect of 
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ontology for conflict problems (F(1, 78) > 1), on non-conflict problems, ontologically 
correct conclusions were endorsed more than incorrect (F(1, 77) = 20.87; p < .001). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Study 4: The interaction between ontology and conflict. 
 
Ontological bias and beliefs about CAM 
The interaction score was indeed negatively correlated with beliefs in CAM (r (N = 77) 
= -.25; p = .026) albeit weakly. This indicates that the ability to be biased by ontology 
in conflict compared to non-conflict problems co-occurs with less faith in CAM. Those 
who cope best with the cognitive challenges of noticing ontological mistakes are also 
the ones who believe less in CAM. This extends research – on the relationship 
between ontological confusion and CAM beliefs (Lindeman, 2011; Svedholm & 
Lindeman, 2013) – by illustrating aspects of the cognitive processes underlying that 
relationship. More specifically, when people are engaged in difficult reasoning, 
believing in CAM might be more likely in those who do not have sufficient cognitive 
capacity to both notice (and be biased by) the ontological mistakes underlying the 
CAM and simultaneously assess the cogency of the argument. This is because both of 
these mental tasks require cognitive resources to be performed. 
 
Conclusions 
Ontologically correct conclusions were endorsed more than ontologically incorrect, 
but this was only on the cognitively less challenging non-conflict problems. This 
supports the prediction that ontological correctness only biases syllogistic reasoning 
when sufficient cognitive capacity is available, as is the case with computationally 
easy non-conflict problems. Keleman and Rossett (2009) showed that detection of 
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ontological mistakes was more difficult when processing time was time-limited, 
indicating that decoding ontological mistakes is a system 2 process. The study 4 
findings are consistent with this, in that ontological correctness does not bias 
responding on conflict syllogisms, because the capacity required for this is being 
used to resolve the belief-logic conflict. 
 
Study 5. Syllogisms with instructions on ontology, believability and 
validity 
In study 4, ontology biased people’s responding, but only when solving cognitively 
undemanding non-conflict problems. This suggests that the decoding of ontological 
mistakes is not a heuristic process like belief evaluation, but rather is an analytic 
process which demands cognitive capacity. In study 4, participants were given no 
prior warning as to the presence of ontological mistakes or how to detect them. 
However, the cognitive load of decoding ontological mistakes might be lessened if 
participants were given detailed instructions on how to spot them and prior warning 
that the materials would contain them. If such instructions can lighten the cognitive 
load, then the interaction between ontology and conflict seen in study 4 might 
dissolve. This is because with recent and detailed instructions, decoding ontological 
mistakes might be less effortful and more like a heuristic process. If so, then detection 
of mistakes could be done even as the mind is directing its resources to other tasks, 
i.e. for resolving the conflict between belief and logic. 
 
Study 5 will test this theory. Participants will be given the same materials as in study 
4, but this time, will be briefed on the presence of ontological mistakes within the 
problems and what such mistakes look like. They will similarly be briefed about the 
presence of believable and unbelievable conclusions. It is expected that ontologically 
correct conclusions will be endorsed more than ontologically incorrect but that there 
will be no interaction between ontology and conflict: the effect of ontology will be 
evident with both conflict and non-conflict syllogisms. 
 
Method 
 
Materials 
The materials were identical to that of study 4 save for the inclusion of additional 
instructions: 
 
Some of the conclusions will be unbelievable (e.g. ‘Therefore pigs can fly’) and 
some will be believable (e.g. ‘Therefore planes can fly’).  
 
Furthermore, some of the conclusions will be technically incorrect. Technically 
incorrect explanations will say that non-intelligent things have mental 
characteristics which only intelligent animals could have e.g.: 
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‘rocks are careful’, or ‘wind is fickle’ 
 
Technically correct explanations will say that non-intelligent things have non-
mental features e.g.:  
 
‘rocks are hard’, or ‘wind is invisible’ 
 
Although the technically incorrect statements can be meant as metaphors, 
taken at face value they cannot be correct, because non-intelligent objects 
cannot possess these features.  
 
Participants were finally told that, in spite of these features, they should suppose that 
all the premises are true and to choose valid only if the conclusion can be derived 
unequivocally from the premises (see also Appendix B). 
 
Participants 
Participants were 163 undergraduate students in psychology (140 females) with a 
mean age of 22 years and seven months (SD = six years and six months). 
 
Procedure 
Participants completed the materials on computer in a psychology lab, in groups of 
up to 60. They were asked to work in silence and were given as much time as they 
wished. 
 
Results  
A 2x2 fully repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. Ontology (correct, incorrect) 
and conflict (conflict, non-conflict) were the factors. The number of conclusions 
endorsed as valid was the dependent variable.  
 
 Ontology Conflict 
 Correct Incorrect Conflict Non-conflict 
Mean 4.44 3.53 3.95 4.02 
SD 1.81 2.58 2.28 2.06 
Table 4.4. Study 5. Descriptives pertaining to the ontology and conflict main 
effects.  
 
There was a main effect of ontology (F(1, 162) = 46.85; p < .001; ph2 = 0.22), as 
shown in Table 4.4, ontologically correct conclusions were endorsed more than 
ontologically incorrect. There was no main effect of conflict (F(1, 162) < 1). There was 
no significant interaction (F(1, 162) = 1.46; p = .229; ph2 = 0.01), as shown in Figure 
4.2, the effect of ontology is evident with both conflict and non-conflict syllogisms. 
Simple effect analyses showed that the higher endorsement of ontologically correct 
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conclusions was statistically significant both for conflict problems (F(1, 162) = 46.74; p 
< .001) and also non-conflict problems (F(1, 162) = 26.31; p < .001). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Study 5: The interaction between ontology and conflict. 
 
Conclusions 
Ontologically correct conclusions were endorsed more than incorrect, as in study 4. 
But unlike in study 4, here the effect of ontology was found even on the 
computationally difficult conflict problems, as well as the less challenging non-conflict 
problems. This suggests that the cognitive load normally incurred when decoding 
ontological mistakes, was relieved by the prior instructions and examples of such 
mistakes. The recency and clarity of these examples might have helped to make 
detection of such mistakes more like a heuristic process and thus easier to perform 
even when cognitive resources are in high demand from attempts to resolve belief-
logic conflict (see Stupple & Ball, 2008). 
 
Discussion 
Authors have argued that ontological mistakes lie at the heart of scientifically 
questionable forms of complementary and alternative medicine (Lindeman, 2011; 
Lindeman & Saher, 2007; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013), that they are linked to belief 
in pseudoscience (Pennycook et al., 2015) and could undermine scientific literacy 
(Keleman & Rosset, 2009). Studies 4 and 5 provide data on how detection of 
ontological mistakes might interact with the process of reasoning.  
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The evidence suggests that identifying ontological mistakes is a system 2 process, 
that analytic processing must be engaged to do it (Keleman & Rossett, 2009) and that 
people who rely less on system 2 processing, make more ontological mistakes 
(Pennycook et al., 2015). Identifying such mistakes is not a system 1 or heuristic 
process which can be done with cognitive ease. If identifying ontological mistakes is a 
system 2 process, then it should require some cognitive capacity to do it. It is known 
that belief – usually a system 1 heuristic process – can bias reasoning (Evans, 2007), 
presumably because belief can be processed even when cognitive capacity is fully 
occupied elsewhere, with simultaneous reasoning (Pennycook et al., 2015; Stupple & 
Ball, 2008). If identifying ontological mistakes is not a heuristic process like belief, but 
is an analytic (system 2) process, then such mistakes should not bias reasoning. This is 
because the cognitive resources normally used to decode ontological mistakes are 
being directed elsewhere - for the purpose of logical analysis.  
 
Study 4 supported this prediction: on computationally easy syllogisms (where belief 
and logic were in accordance), ontological correctness biased logical responding, 
presumably because these easier syllogisms did not deplete the cognitive resources 
required for noticing ontological mistakes. However, on the more computationally 
difficult problems – where belief and logic conflicted, ontological correctness did not 
bias responding at all, suggesting that the cognitive capacity required for noticing 
such mistakes was unavailable and the bias was therefore not observed. In study 5, 
the cognitive demands for noticing ontological mistakes were relieved by providing 
detailed instructions on what these mistakes look like. Following this intervention, 
ontological correctness biased logical responding once again, even on the 
cognitively demanding conflict syllogisms. 
 
Together, these findings have implications for people’s understanding of CAM. If 
CAM is often underpinned by ontologically incorrect claims (Lindeman, 2011; 
Lindeman & Saher, 2007; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2012), e.g. energy as good or bad, 
misrepresenting processes (e.g. energy, heat, etc.) as objects, or attributing mental 
abilities to physical objects (e.g. water has memory), then the ability to notice the 
incorrectness of such claims can protect one against investing in scientifically invalid 
therapies. Outside the laboratory however, when people are exposed to arguments 
about the effectiveness of CAM, those people are not merely processing the 
meaning of isolated statements. When assessing such claims, they will also be 
thinking – i.e. drawing inferences and constructing arguments (Hoeken et al., 2012; 
Schellens et al., 2017) and this is likely to be an analytical process which requires 
cognitive resources (Shaw, 1996). If evaluating claims about a form of CAM uses 
valuable cognitive resources, then there might not be enough remaining cognitive 
capacity to decode the ontological mistakes. 
 
However, study 5 shows that a simple intervention to educate people about the 
nature of ontological mistakes, can increase the degree to which ontological 
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correctness biases reasoning, even when cognitive demands are high. The question 
here is whether education can equip people with a more intuitive grasp of what 
ontological mistakes are. If education can make ontological understanding less 
effortful and more heuristic-like, then people might be better able to spot ontological 
mistakes even when simultaneously evaluating the arguments and inferences behind 
a claim. Following such interventions, even cogent arguments about a form of CAM 
might become less persuasive to people if those arguments rely on ontological 
mistakes.  
 
The question as to whether education can give people a more heuristic-like and 
effortless grasp of ontological correctness is one for future studies. In study 5, people 
were tested immediately after instructions on ontology were given. The longevity of 
this effect was not tested. Future studies might explore whether it is possible to 
sustain the effect over time and if so, how much and what kind of education is 
needed to produce it. 
 
In study 4, although people were, on average, not biased by ontology on conflict 
problems, individual differences in this were negatively related to CAM beliefs. The 
correlation was small but if this can be replicated in future studies, it would support 
other research in which fall-back on system 1 and failure to engage system 2 
processing have been proposed as important components in CAM beliefs (Lindeman, 
2011; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2012), beliefs in pseudoscience (Pennycook et al., 
2015) and also in paranormal beliefs (Riekki, Lindeman & Lipsanen, 2013; Svedholm & 
Lindeman, 2013). However, as the correlation was small this requires robust 
replication before confident conclusions can be drawn. 
 
Future studies might consider some of the limitations of the current methodology. In 
order to generalise these findings, these effects should be tested on a wider range of 
materials, encompassing a wider range of ontological mistakes. Furthermore, 
although believability and ontology were manipulated, they also overlap and future 
research should aim to dissociate one from the other as much as is possible. The 
current findings are consistent with the claim that ontological awareness is a system 2 
process, but there are other ways in which such a claim could be tested. For example, 
dual-task methods to assess the role of working memory in detection of ontological 
mistakes (Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick & Wynn, 1993). Finally, testing these effects with 
materials containing real-life CAM-related arguments would allow for more confident 
generalisations to be made. 
 
In conclusion, studies 4 and 5 offer evidence that ontological mistakes fail to bias 
responding when people are engaged in cognitively-demanding logical reasoning. 
Detailed instruction on how to decode ontological mistakes appears to restore 
people’s ability to notice them when reasoning. This suggests that detection of 
ontological mistakes is a system 2 process, which might be made less cognitively 
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challenging through instruction. Studies 4 and 5 provide new knowledge about a 
potentially important bias in health beliefs (particularly beliefs about CAM) and 
furthermore on how health psycho-educational interventions might utilise this 
knowledge to reduce the effect of this bias. Thus studies 4 and 5 are of relevance to 
health psychologists interested in the cognitive factors underpinning health beliefs. 
 
Chapter 5. General discussion 
 
Summary of the findings 
Study 1 
In study 1, a measure of CAM beliefs and CAM use was created and tested: the 
attitudes to complementary and alternative medicine scale (ACAM). The ACAM was 
designed to measure beliefs about the effectiveness of five types of CAM (AWMS, 
energy medicine, herbalism, body manipulation and mind and body techniques), for 
various purposes (serious conditions, non-serious conditions, long-term conditions, 
wellbeing, psychological, preventative). Following principal components analysis, 15 
items settled into four factors (AWMS, energy medicine, herbalism and mind and 
body techniques). Five items relating to CAM for serious conditions were retained as 
a fifth factor, as for theoretical reasons, this was an important variable to test in 
studies 2 and 3. Items on CAM use were not included in the PCA, but were also 
retained for testing in studies 2 and 3, leaving 25 items in total. The ACAM had good 
internal consistency and satisfactory construct validity.  
 
Studies 2 and 3. 
Self-reported thinking style was found to predict beliefs in CAM effectiveness. These 
relationships depended on the type of CAM in question: thinking style was related to 
faith in some types of CAM but not all. Furthermore, the nature of these relationships 
depended on the sample: in psychology students, those who thought themselves to 
be rational thinkers were less likely to believe in CAM; in a more heterogeneous 
sample consisting of the general public and undergraduates from numerous 
disciplines, those who thought of themselves as intuitive thinkers were more likely to 
believe in CAM. Although self-reported thinking style predicted some CAM beliefs, 
actual thinking performance was less predictive of CAM beliefs. The cognitive 
reflection test failed to predict CAM beliefs in any of the analyses from studies 2 and 
3. However, in study 3, the base rate problems were related to belief in CAM for 
serious conditions and also CAM use.  
 
Studies 4 and 5 
The tendency to make ontological mistakes is an important cognitive bias 
underpinning beliefs in CAM (Lindeman, 2011). Studies 4 and 5 addressed the 
question of whether detection of ontological mistakes was a system 2, analytic 
process, as opposed to a system 1, heuristic process. It was found that ontological 
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correctness biases reasoning on easier reasoning problems. But when cognitive 
demands are high (such as when grappling with a conflict between logic and belief), 
ontological correctness biases reasoning much less. However, when detailed 
instructions on ontology are given, ontological correctness biases reasoning once 
again, even on the computationally difficult problems, presumably because the 
instructions lighten the cognitive load. These findings suggest that the detection of 
ontology is not a heuristic bias (like believability for example) that people can fall 
back onto when processing capacity is exhausted. Instead, detection of ontological 
mistakes resembles a system 2, analytic process (relatively effortful, non-automatic). 
There was also evidence that individual differences in the ability to be biased by 
ontological correctness, even when processing demands were high, is linked with less 
faith in CAM.  
 
Contribution to knowledge 
It is argued here that this thesis makes three original contributions to knowledge. 
 
The heterogeneity of CAM beliefs. 
Studies 1-3 illustrate that belief in the effectiveness of CAM varies considerably 
according to the type of CAM under consideration. Furthermore, the psychological 
correlates of CAM beliefs also vary depending on the type and purpose of CAM. 
Beliefs in energy medicines and the effectiveness of CAM for serious conditions were 
both associated with self-reported thinking style in both studies 2 and 3. The 
correlates of other CAM beliefs were less stable across studies 2 and 3 and future 
studies might help to establish the replicability of these relationships. 
 
The distinction between self-reported and performance thinking style 
Previous studies on the relation between CAM beliefs and thinking have relied on 
self-report measures of thinking (Lindeman, 2011; Saher & Lindeman, 2005; 
Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013). It was argued here that self-report questionnaires are 
insufficient as tests of reasoning, as they rely on accurate metacognition and do not 
correlate with performance measures of thinking (Newstead et al., 2004). This is the 
first study of which the author is aware, in which performance measures of thinking 
style (such as the CRT and base rate tasks) have been used to test the previously 
reported relationship between intuitive thinking and CAM beliefs. In the current 
studies, consistent with previous research, relationships between self-reported 
thinking style and CAM beliefs were found. But in contrast to expectations, 
relationships between actual thinking style and CAM beliefs were less frequently 
observed. This suggests that it is how people see their own cognition more than the 
cognition itself which might be most important here. Rather than a cognitive bias, 
one might describe this as a metacognitive bias. It could be that those who see 
themselves as intuitive thinkers identify more so with the concept of CAM. 
Conversely, those who see themselves as analytical thinkers identify less with the 
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unscientific nature of CAM, regardless of whether they themselves actually reason 
analytically in practice – it is how they perceive their thinking to be which is most 
important. What remains to be explored is whether people’s self-reported thinking 
style also correlates with their view of what good thinking looks like (see Baron, 
1995). This offers a new direction for follow-up studies. 
 
Another question for follow-up research is whether the type of performance measure 
used to measure intuitive/rational thinking is a factor. Although the CRT did not 
predict CAM beliefs, base rate problems did predict one type of CAM belief in study 
3. There are numerous other performance measures of intuitive/rational thinking (see 
Toplak et al., 2011) and future studies might explore further whether the presence or 
absence of relationships between CAM beliefs and thinking are due to task effects – 
i.e. whether other tests of miserly thinking (e.g. ratio bias, belief bias, disjunctive 
reasoning, etc.; see Stanovich, West & Toplak, 2017) predict CAM beliefs more 
strongly than others.  
 
Detection of ontological mistakes is a system 2 process 
Previous work had indicated that detection of ontological mistakes by adults, was 
relatively easy when cognitive processing was unimpeded. Ontological mistakes 
could be easily detected by engaging ontologically mature knowledge (Keleman & 
Rosset, 2003). However, detection of ontological mistakes was more difficult when 
processing time was limited and especially in adults with poorer inhibitory control. In 
light of these findings, in studies 4 and 5, it was predicted and demonstrated that the 
detection of ontological mistakes is an analytical process which is more difficult to do 
when a person is simultaneously engaged in cognitively-demanding reasoning. This 
suggests that although people can be influenced by ontological mistakes when 
cognitive demands are low, when they are simultaneously drawing inferences or 
formulating arguments, such mistakes are less likely to be noticed. In everyday life, 
when evaluating information related to CAM, individuals are likely be simultaneously 
drawing inferences and arguments (which require cognitive processing) and the 
current findings suggest therefore, that at such times, ontological mistakes will not 
always be detected. More optimistically, the current work indicates that educating 
people about the nature of ontological mistakes can make it easier for people to be 
biased by them (or notice them), even when processing demands are high. This 
opens-up a new direction for future studies, that is, to explore the most effective 
ways of educating people about ontological mistakes in relation to CAM. 
 
Relevance to health psychology 
The studies reported here have been concerned with cognitive bias associated with 
beliefs in and use of CAM. CAM represents a popular health choice for many people 
across the world, and therefore understanding CAM beliefs and CAM-related 
behaviour helps to shed light on an important aspect of health behaviour. 
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CAM is usually separate from mainstream science, there are doubts about its 
effectiveness and it has a questionable evidence-base (Angell & Kassirer, 1998; 
Barnes, 2003). In studying the cognitive (or metacognitive) biases that relate to CAM 
beliefs, the implication is that people make irrational or unscientific health choices, in 
part because they sometimes fall-back on short-cuts in cognitive processing. One of 
the recommendations from chapter 4 (studies 4 and 5) is that simple educational 
interventions might ease the cognitive challenges in detecting the unscientific 
principles which underpin CAM. Furthermore, the findings from chapter 3 (studies 2-
3) also offer potential for intervention: psychologists do not necessarily have to 
change people’s actual thinking style, but rather change the thinking style they value. 
By valuing a rational thinking style, people might begin to value more evidence-
based health schemes, even if they are unable to do rational thinking in practice. 
 
So it is argued here that the findings add new knowledge about beliefs and cognition 
in relation to CAM, but also that this knowledge has the potential to inform effective 
interventions to change behaviour or attitudes.  
 
Finally, this raises another question: is it ethical to change people’s beliefs about 
CAM? Although the evidence on CAM effectiveness is questioned by many (e.g. 
Talalay & Talalay, 2001), there is a branch of neuroscience which illustrates the 
potential importance of CAM. Psychoneuroimmunology is the study of the interaction 
between psychological states and the immune system (Dinan & Cryan, 2017; Kiecolt-
Glaser, McGuire, Robles & Glaser, 2002). There is a vast amount of research evidence 
showing that negative psychological states are linked to disease (Everson, Kaplan, 
Goldberg & Salonen, 2000; Glaser, 2005; Reiche, Nunes & Morimoto, 2004) and that 
positive psychological states such as hopefulness can improve symptoms and survival 
rates (Ho, Ho, Bonanno, Chu & Chan, 2010; Lewis, Dennis, O’rourke & Sharpe, 2001). 
It has been shown that complementary therapies can facilitate improvements in 
hopefulness and affect in patients with physical disease (Bishop, Yardley & Lewith, 
2010; Hsu, Blue Spruce, Sherman & Cherkin, 2010). This raises the question of 
whether it is ethical to discredit forms of CAM which might do good, albeit only as 
elaborate placebos (Dorn, Kaptchuk, Park, Nguyen, Canenguez, Nam, ... & Lembo, 
2007)? 
 
Perhaps the answer lies in re-defining CAM, so that claims about CAM effectiveness 
are not based upon mysticism and myth, but instead on evidence-based knowledge 
as to the psychoneuroimmunological benefits that improvements in hope, and affect 
can bring. If CAM could be reconfigured so that its practitioners attribute its benefits 
not to myth but neuroscience, they could focus their practice on aspects of CAM such 
as empathy, practitioner-patient relationship, relaxation, etc. which are scientifically 
evidenced (Kaplan, Greenfield & Ware Jr, 1989).  
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From this argument, psychological interventions which help people to discern against 
pseudoscientific therapies will not necessarily remove the potential for CAM to do 
good, if CAM practitioners can embrace scientific explanations for why their therapies 
work in place of the mystical. 
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Chapter 6. Reflective Essay on my Development as a Health 
Psychologist 
 
Introduction 
This essay will document my development as a professional health psychologist from 
December 2014 up to the end of November 2016. My background is that of an 
academic psychologist who has for some years been researching and teaching in the 
areas of mental health and health psychology (HP). Since the beginning of 2016, I 
have also been working in an NHS setting as a trainee health psychologist on 
placement. The essay will be divided into two sections: in Part 1, my development 
will be described mainly in relation to my academic work: how my development in HP 
has been reflected in research, teaching and supervision from 2014 to 2015. In Part 2 
of this essay, I describe my continued development more so as reflected by my 
applied HP work. This second part covers the period of January to November 2016. 
 
Part 1, November 2014 – December 2015 
My background and role as an academic psychologist.  
I completed a PhD in cognition and mental health in 2006. Although my PhD was on 
mental health, I had moved into health psychology research at round the time I was 
finishing the PhD. At that time I was working as a research fellow and was involved in 
various funded projects in the area of health psychology. This led me to begin BPS 
stage 1 training in HP in 2007. In 2008 I took a lectureship at Wolverhampton and 
began teaching in psychobiology and research methods at undergraduate level. My 
duties also involved supervision of doctoral trainees in counselling psychology and 
PhD students. My research was broadly on beliefs and cognition in relation to health 
and mental health. 
 
As I began the professional doctorate in HP at UWE in 2014, there were a number of 
areas I was looking to develop. I was developing doctoral supervision, research 
output and also teaching – the latter primarily through an undergraduate module in 
HP.  
 
Doctoral Supervision 
By 2014 I was director of studies for four PhD students whose projects were broadly 
on beliefs and cognition in mental health and health. I was also supervising the 
research projects of six counselling psychology doctoral trainees. As a doctoral 
supervisor I was developing two important skills: Communication: effective 
supervision is built upon effective professional relationships embodying respect. This 
requires technical communication: guiding the student in decision-making, explaining 
concepts, theory, methods, analysis, writing, etc. It also requires emotional support 
and encouragement. Besides this, I feel that as a supervisor, I must model 
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professional standards too: including legal ethical codes for research, professional 
standards of communicating, standards relating to the dissemination of research and 
the importance of the scientific approach as a psychologist. The second key skill here 
is research leadership. Providing guidance, encouragement, support and instruction 
when necessary, so that the student has an appropriate role model for how research 
is conducted and for how research alliances are formed, with respect and 
inclusiveness as central values. The role of a research leader is also one of enabler, 
providing others with the confidence to act independently and to feel able to express 
their creative drive.  
 
Research 
As a researcher I had been leading on my own projects for a number of years and 
had built up a strong portfolio of publications. I was also leading a research group 
within my department. The group was named Cognition in Context 
(http://www.wlv.ac.uk/research/institutes-and-centres/psychology-research/research-
groups/cognition-in-context-research-group/). We had between 8 and 12 members 
(academics and PhD students) and collectively we were producing a high volume of 
research outputs (journal papers, book chapters and conference talks). The remit of 
the group was to support collaborative research projects between members. My 
principal role was to help bring members together to initiate new projects and also to 
support younger members as they launched their own research careers. 
 
By 2015 I had a number of partnerships with researchers in other parts of the UK and 
overseas (France and Japan) and was leading on numerous projects. At this time 
(2014/2015) I began to focus my efforts intensively on gaining research funding. A 
number of bids were submitted with various partners. The most successful were in 
collaboration with an external research company Tiller Research, based in 
Worcestershire. They conduct commissioned research, mostly for charitable and 
publically funded organisations. In 2015, Tiller research and myself were successful 
with two research bids. The first was a project Funded by ASDAN (approximately 
£13000); an evaluation of a holistic, psychosocial intervention for children 
transitioning to secondary school. The second was funded by Herefordshire Council 
(approximately £42000): an evaluation of an intervention to promote exercise in the 
people of Herefordshire. My role in these partnerships was to provide advice on 
ethics, methodology and analysis. 
 
In terms of publications, I had been successful there too producing articles in 
attitudes and beliefs in health and mental health. These publications were with 
various research partners and with my PhD students. In 2014, myself and two 
colleagues had secured a book contract: a festschrift for my former PhD supervisor 
and mentor Ken Manktelow. I was lead editor and this required that I attract high 
quality authors to write the chapters. The editorial team had to decide on the remit 
for the book (cognitive psychology of thinking, particularly in relation to real-life 
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contexts). We gathered together a fantastic collection of authors from across the UK, 
Europe, the Far East and North America. I had a great relationship with the other 
editors and together we were able to see the book through to publication in 2016. 
The publication of this text will add momentum to my recent research on the role of 
reasoning in health choices. 
 
Teaching 
My teaching responsibilities were mainly at undergraduate level in psychology: 
psychobiology and research methods. In 2014, I was also asked to re-launch a final 
year, undergraduate module in HP (Applications of Health Psychology). The module 
focuses on theoretical foundations as well as applied HP. 
 
These areas (supervision, research and teaching) represented my principal foci as of 
late 2014. Thus I was engaged in health psychology-related work, capable of meeting 
some of the BPS/ HCPC competencies for HP: communicating/disseminating 
psychological concepts and research; practising within legal codes; using my own 
judgment and working autonomously; giving advice and guidance; forging 
collaborations and leading teams.  
 
At the time I began the prof. doc. at UWE, I was no longer content to research and 
teach concepts without experience in applied psychology to complement them. I had 
spent much time reading, writing and talking about clinical–related phenomena but 
had spent little time since 2008 engaging with people in clinical or health-related 
contexts. This was an area of my practice that needed development, and from late 
2015 my focus changed so as to pursue this development need. 
 
Part 2, December 2015 – November 2016 
The beginning of my applied work came in December 2015, when I ran a stress 
management workshop with West Midlands Police. This was the project completed 
as part of the prof. doc consultancy competency. It was the first applied work I had 
done in some years and forced me to learn a new therapeutic framework (solution-
focused therapy; O’Connell, 2005). I then adapted this to develop a new academic 
stress management service for final year undergraduate students at my university. 
This formed the basis for the behaviour change competency. 
 
At this point I had met the requirements for the above competencies. However, as 
mentioned in the previous section, my motivation was to develop into a different kind 
of psychologist with different skills, and the process of studying on the prof. doc. at 
UWE had accelerated this interest. My wish was to use this training in order to work in 
applied psychology, not merely to continue as before. To this end, I made use of 
personal contacts to negotiate a health psychology placement at a physical health 
psychology service in the Black Country Partnership NHS Foundation Trust. The 
service provides psychological support to NHS patients with chronic conditions (e.g. 
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stroke, heart disease, cancer, kidney disease, chronic pain, etc.) who have 
psychological needs. The service is substantial, with over ten psychologists and 
numerous counsellors and therapists. The team operates across numerous sites 
including Cross Street Clinic, Russells Hall Hospital and The Guest Hospital all in 
Dudley in the West Midlands. 
 
My supervisor was Prof. Anthony Schwartz an experienced clinical and health 
psychologist. My initial work on placement involved shadowing a psychologist at a 
pain screening clinic. The clinic was multi-disciplinary, whereby patients with pain 
could visit a consultant, a physiotherapist and a psychologist in sequence to gain a 
holistic assessment of their needs. The psychologist’s role was to assess whether the 
patients would be suitable for various forms of psychological input: pain management 
programme/fibromyalgia support group, psychological therapy, counselling/CBT, or 
a referral to mental health. After a few weeks of shadowing the psychologist, I began 
to lead the screening sessions. The screening was structured and principally a time-
limited (20 mins) information-gathering process. Here I learned some important 
clinical skills: working with couples (patients were usually accompanied by partners 
and the screening protocol included questions about intimate relationships) and 
using subtle non-verbal communication (e.g. changing seating posture) to prompt a 
change in conversation (important in a time-limited session). 
 
The main psychological challenge with the patients in these clinics was to match their 
psychological needs (if they indeed had any) to the appropriate psychological 
support. For example, patients who were very much precontemplative about 
changing their lifestyle, or who had enduring and historical mental health needs, 
would be unsuited to the PMP. After attending a number of these clinics, I felt that it 
would be helpful to see the PMP in action, so that I might have a better idea of which 
patients would be best suited to this option. Therefore my next venture was to attend 
a full eight-week cycle of the PMP. 
 
The version of the PMP that I joined was based on CBT and was aimed at identifying 
maladaptive thinking and behaviour patterns, as well as providing psychoeducation, 
physio-education, exercise, relaxation and goal setting. I attended for the full cycle 
and contributed to the psychoeducation. 
 
By this point, I had been shadowing a psychologist colleague (Dr John Donohue) in 
his work with oncology patients and had been shadowing my supervisor (AS) in his 
therapeutic work with renal patients. These sessions helped me to experience 
different therapeutic approaches but I also learned the process of taking clinical 
notes. The Trust has a policy on note-taking and I was tutored in this system by a 
colleague. Thus I learned the importance of efficient note-taking and record-keeping: 
notes should be legible, understandable by non-psychologists and accessible to the 
patient should they wish to see them. 
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In May 2016, I began leading assessments in oncology with JD shadowing me. I was 
given detailed guidance in conducting assessments with oncology patients.  JD 
provided thorough feedback on my therapeutic skills and we had discussions on the 
approach I’d taken. This work gradually developed with me leading on post-
assessment sessions and delivering interventions. In the summer months I began to 
see patients unaccompanied, although still working with JD’s guidance and under 
supervision from AS. A similar process developed with patients under renal care. I 
began to see patients on my own without an accompanying psychologist, but still 
engaged in regular and frequent supervision.  
 
Part of my supervision involved introduction to new approaches but my therapeutic 
work was founded on a Rogerian client-centred model (Rogers, 1957). Building on 
this, acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT: Hayes, 2004) also began to feature 
in my work.  ACT was practised by a number of the psychologists I worked with on 
placement and it was recommended that I trained in it due to its usefulness when 
working with patients with chronic conditions. I did indeed follow this advice and 
enrolled on an ACT workshop at Birmingham University in October 2016. To 
complement this, I immersed myself in an ACT text recommended to me by my 
supervisor AS (Harris, 2009). Continuing with close supervision, I continued to 
integrate ACT in to my therapeutic work. At the current time, I am still working under 
close supervision, providing psychological therapy to patients being treated for 
cancer and patients with renal disease. I continue to see some patients on my own. 
With some patients, particularly those with complex issues, I lead the session but am 
accompanied by my colleague JD.  
 
Conclusions 
The NHS placement has given me the opportunity to develop therapeutic and 
behaviour change skills in HP. This work has enabled me to adapt to new skills in 
relation to patient work. These include: ethical codes of working with patients, such 
as being non-discriminatory, and aware of the power imbalance (for example, one of 
the first things I emphasise for patients in initial assessments is that the session is for 
them to decide whether they want to work with me, as much as it is for me to assess 
how I can help them); to apply principles of informed consent and confidentiality to 
patient work; the importance of note-taking and careful record-keeping; 
communication and tailoring psychological advice so as to be sensitive to the 
context; protecting patients from harm; being aware of the limits of my own 
competence and the importance of reviewing competence continually, and how 
supervision is an essential part of this process; working in a multidisciplinary team. 
The NHS placement has driven me to develop into an applied psychologist and a 
significant element of this change is not only learning to apply psychological 
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techniques in health-related settings such as the NHS, but also learning the 
professional skills that such a psychologist must embody.  
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Appendices. 
Appendix A. Task from study 4. 
 
Firstly, you are going to receive a series of thinking problems. Each one contains two 
statements followed by a conclusion. You must decide whether the conclusion follows 
logically or not from the statements before it.  
 
So, you must decide if the given conclusion follows logically from the statements. Choose 
VALID if, and only if, you judge that the conclusion can he derived unequivocally from the 
two statements before it, otherwise choose INVALID. 
 
Here are three simple practice problems before you start: 
All A are B 
C are A 
Conclusion: Therefore C are B 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
 
All A are B 
C are B 
Conclusion: Therefore C are A 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
 
All A are B 
C are not B 
Conclusion: Therefore C are not A 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
 
 
Now you've done the practice problems, you can begin the real problems. First though, 
please indicate your age and sex. 
 
Age Sex 
 
  
All fast things are dangerous 
Rivers are fast 
Conclusion: Therefore rivers are 
dangerous 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All wise things are useful 
Trees are useful  
Conclusion: Therefore trees are wise 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All fragile things are intricate 
Hammers are not intricate 
Conclusion: Therefore hammers are not 
fragile 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All light things are fluffy 
Clouds are fluffy 
Conclusion: Therefore clouds are light 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All dry things are plain 
Deserts are plain 
Conclusion: Therefore deserts are dry 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All simple things are visible 
Atoms are simple 
Conclusion: Therefore atoms are visible 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
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All bright things are selfish 
Sunshine is bright  
Conclusion: Therefore sunshine is selfish 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
Valuable things are popular 
The pyramids are not popular 
Conclusion: Therefore the pyramids are 
not valuable 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
Complex things are tiring 
Languages are not tiring 
Conclusion: Therefore languages are not 
complex 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All machines are human-made 
Televisions are machines 
Conclusion: Therefore televisions are 
human-made 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All underwater things are tasty  
Farms are tasty 
Conclusion: Therefore farms are 
underwater 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All silent things are generous 
Apple orchards are silent 
Conclusion: Therefore apple orchards are 
generous 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All composed things are peaceful 
The moon is peaceful 
Conclusion: Therefore the moon is 
composed 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
Electrical things are unpredictable 
Beaches are not unpredictable 
Conclusion: Therefore beaches are not 
electrical 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All complex things are pleasurable 
Diseases are complex things 
Conclusion: Therefore diseases are 
pleasurable 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All dangerous things are vindictive 
Viruses are dangerous 
Conclusion: Therefore viruses are 
vindictive 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All stretchy things are funny 
Bones are funny 
Conclusion: Therefore bones are stretchy 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All miserly things are strange 
Mountains are strange  
Conclusion: Therefore, mountains are 
miserly 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All natural things are conscientious 
Soil erosion is a natural thing 
Conclusion: Therefore soil erosion is 
conscientious 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All thoughtful things are loud 
Asteroids are loud 
Conclusion: Therefore asteroids are 
thoughtful 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
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Appendix B. Task from study 5. 
 
You are going to receive a series of thinking problems. Each one contains two statements 
followed by a conclusion. You must decide whether the conclusion follows logically or not 
from the statements before it.  
 
Some of the conclusions will be unbelievable (e.g. ‘Therefore pigs can fly’) and some will be 
believable (e.g. ‘Therefore planes can fly’).  
 
Furthermore, some of the conclusions will be technically incorrect. Technically incorrect 
explanations will say that non-intelligent things have mental characteristics which only 
intelligent animals could have e.g.: 
 
‘rocks are careful’, or ‘wind is fickle’ 
 
Technically correct explanations will say that non-intelligent things have non-mental features 
e.g.:  
 
‘rocks are hard’, or ‘wind is invisible’ 
 
Although the technically incorrect statements can be meant as metaphors, taken at face value 
they cannot be correct, because non-intelligent objects cannot possess these features.  
 
Despite the fact that some statements are unbelievable or believable, technically correct or 
incorrect, you must suppose that the statements are all true and decide if the given conclusion 
follows logically from the statements. Choose VALID if, and only if, you judge that the 
conclusion can he derived unequivocally from the two statements before it, otherwise choose 
NOT VALID. 
 
Here are three simple practice problems before you start: 
All A are B 
C are A 
Conclusion: Therefore C are B 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
 
All A are B 
C are B 
Conclusion: Therefore C are A 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
 
All A are B 
C are not B 
Conclusion: Therefore C are not A 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
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Now you've done the practice problems, you can begin the real problems. First though, 
please indicate your age and sex. 
 
Age Sex 
 
All silent things are generous 
Apple orchards are silent 
Conclusion: Therefore apple orchards are 
generous 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All light things are fluffy 
Clouds are fluffy 
Conclusion: Therefore clouds are light 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
Electrical things are unpredictable 
Beaches are not unpredictable 
Conclusion: Therefore beaches are not 
electrical 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All complex things are pleasurable 
Diseases are complex things 
Conclusion: Therefore diseases are 
pleasurable 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All dry things are plain 
Deserts are plain 
Conclusion: Therefore deserts are dry 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All simple things are visible 
Atoms are simple 
Conclusion: Therefore atoms are visible 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All bright things are selfish 
Sunshine is bright  
Conclusion: Therefore sunshine is selfish 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All natural things are conscientious 
Soil erosion is a natural thing 
Conclusion: Therefore soil erosion is 
conscientious 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
Complex things are tiring 
Languages are not tiring 
Conclusion: Therefore languages are not 
complex 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All machines are human-made 
Televisions are machines 
Conclusion: Therefore televisions are 
human-made 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All fast things are dangerous 
Rivers are fast 
Conclusion: Therefore rivers are 
dangerous 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All wise things are useful 
Trees are useful  
Conclusion: Therefore trees are wise 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All composed things are peaceful 
The moon is peaceful 
Conclusion: Therefore the moon is 
composed 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All fragile things are intricate 
Hammers are not intricate 
Conclusion: Therefore hammers are not 
fragile 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
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All underwater things are tasty  
Farms are tasty 
Conclusion: Therefore farms are 
underwater 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All dangerous things are vindictive 
Viruses are dangerous 
Conclusion: Therefore viruses are 
vindictive 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All stretchy things are funny 
Bones are funny 
Conclusion: Therefore bones are stretchy 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All miserly things are strange 
Mountains are strange  
Conclusion: Therefore, mountains are 
miserly 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
All thoughtful things are loud 
Asteroids are loud 
Conclusion: Therefore asteroids are 
thoughtful 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
Valuable things are popular 
The pyramids are not popular 
Conclusion: Therefore the pyramids are 
not valuable 
¨ Valid 
¨ Invalid 
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